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Relationship dissolutionThis paper reports the results of a qualitative study undertaken to understand the nature of trust and its con-
sequences for both suppliers and buyers in short term (relatively new) and long term (older/more mature)
relationships in inter-organizational contexts. Scholars have recently pointed out the importance of research
that investigates the temporal characteristics and dynamics of trust in inter-organizational studies. Our paper
responds to this call by indentifying the changing nature of the level of trust as the buyer–supplier relation-
ship matures. Our ﬁndings contribute to sparse and conﬂicting previous research on the relationship between
length of partnership and perceptions of trust, types of dark side consequences of trusting relationships, and
reasons buyers and suppliers continue or terminate low/no-trust associations. Speciﬁcally, we illustrate that
buyers and suppliers draw on substantially different metaphors for understanding the nature of trust in long
and short term exchange relationships. Suppliers see marked differences in trust with long term versus short
term exchange partners, while buyers see little or no difference. Suppliers and buyers also appear to have dif-
ferent conceptions of how trust is nested (or not) within the broader economic and/or personal relationship.
Through our inductive model, we elaborate several types of betrayal and disappointment, distinguish several
factors that lead suppliers and buyers to stay in relationships with partners they don't trust, and identify key
issues that topple untrusting relationships into terminated relationships.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
One of the central issues in inter-organizational studies is under-
standing and managing relationships between ﬁrms. For example, the
long tradition within marketing of studying inter-organizational rela-
tionships goes back to the foundations of the discipline (e.g. Alderson,
1958, 1965; McGary, 1952). After a couple of decades of neglect,
scholars have regained their interest in the topic and focused on
inter-organizational relations in such areas as industrial marketing
(Hakansson, 1982; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995), relationship market-
ing (e.g. Ganesan, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sheth & Parvatiyar,
1994), and marketing channels (e.g. Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987). The
majority of this research, both in marketing and business in general
(e.g. Casson, 1990; Ghosal & Bartlett, 1990), is interested in the role
and signiﬁcance of developing “trusting” relationships. In other words,
trust has been identiﬁed as one of the central constructs in
inter-organizational relationships (Smith & Barclay, 1997).
Scholars in marketing, as well as in management, have paid
increasing attention to various aspects of trust, including its concep-
tualization (e.g. Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Lewicki & Bunker,
1995; Sitkin & Roth, 1993); development (e.g. Blau, 1964; Rempel,
Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Zand, 1972); different forms (Barber, 1983;
Bowlby, 1982; McAllister, 1995; Shapiro, 1987; Thomas & Skinner,rights reserved.2010; Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999; Zucker, 1986); uses as a control
mechanism (e.g. Argyris, 1952; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Huemer,
Bostrom, & Felzensztein, 2009; Oliver, 1990; Yang, Zhou, & Jiang,
2011); consequences such as cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Mayer,
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McAllister, 1995), conﬁdence (Dasgupta,
1998; Das & Teng, 1998), competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen,
1994); antecedents such as culture (Cox, 1991; Doney, Cannon, &
Mullen, 1998; Lohtia, Bello, & Porter, 2009; Nametz & Christensen,
1996), trusting dispositions (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany,
1998; Rotter, 1967), satisfaction (e.g. Greenberg, 1997; Leonidou,
Talias, & Leonidou, 2008; Lewicki, 1983); and the violation and
abuse of trust (e.g. Bies & Tripp, 1996; Granovetter, 1985; Hogan &
Hogan, 1994; Wang & Huff, 2007).
In spite of this high level of interest in the topic, there are still many
areas of trust that are either unexplored or unresolved. As a recent
review article published in Industrial Marketing and Management
notes; “Despite the increased interest among the academics, the theory
of trust is still developing” (Seppanen, Blomqvist, & Sundqvist, 2007, p.
249). In addition to the growing number of journal articles, there have
also been several special issues (e.g. Academy of Management Review-
AMR 1998; Organization Science 2001 and 2003; Journal of European
Marketing-JEM 2007). As Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998)
indicated in the introduction of the AMR special issue, trust is an inter-
disciplinary and a very complex topic: “A phenomenon as complex as
trust requires theory and research methodology that reﬂect trust's
many facets and levels” (p. 393). In addition, the other special issues
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tive methods to better understand the complex nature of the role of
trust in inter-organizational contexts. For example, in his introduction
of the JEM special issue, Arnott (2007) called for “interpretivist ap-
proaches to the study of trust, what is in essence, an immeasurable
entity” (p. 986), and after analyzing about 15 years of empirical-
quantitative studies on trust, Seppanen et al. (2007) pointed out the
need for “qualitative empirical studies…for a concept that is apparently
not easily quantiﬁable” (p. 261). Encouraged by these calls, in this
paper, we review some of the recent works in business-to-business
marketing, draw research questions from these studies, and through
the use of interpretative research methodologies, provide some di-
rections to the rather complex dynamics of inter-organizational
relationships.
More speciﬁcally, we draw on semi-structured in-depth interviews
with over 70 industrial buyers and suppliers from various industries
on the topic of trust in exchange relationships. We intend to provide
directions and possible answers to the issue of the dynamics between
relationship duration and level of trust, and the role of trust in the
maintenance and/or dissolution of an established organizational buyer–
supplier relationship.
2. Background
The role of trust in relationship continuation and termination is
an intriguing but understudied topic. A review of recent work indi-
cates that trust in marketing has been largely viewed as a construct
that increases commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), satisfaction
(Andaleeb, 1996; Anderson & Narus, 1990), cooperation (Anderson
& Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), performance (Dahlstrom &
Nygaard, 1995), signals long-term orientation (Ganesan, 1994;
Zhao & Cavusgil, 2006), and propensity to stay in the relationship
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989). A few researchers have reported less
positive correlates of trust. For example, Moorman, Zaltman, and
Deshpande (1992) reported that trust between partners declined
as their relationship evolved. The authors explained their results
by proposing that clients may come to believe that certain service
providers in long term relationships are taking advantage of the
trust between the two parties, thus acting opportunistically. Grayson
and Ambler (1999) replicated the Moorman et al. study in an English
advertising industry setting. They found similar results but failed
to explain them using opportunistic behaviors. As a result, growing
evidence suggests that trust can help a relationship to prosper and
at the same time can have “dark side” implications, leading to sub-
stantial damage to one or both parties involved in the relationship.
These arguments need further empirical investigation.
In addition, as detailed in the following sub-sections, past
studies report conﬂicting ﬁndings and conclusions regarding the
“consequences” of trusting relationships. There is a need for a more
penetrating, in-depth exploration of relationships between the dura-
tion of the relationship and level of trust, and the level of trust and
relationship behavior. In this section, we brieﬂy review the under-
studied and often conﬂicting conceptual and empirical studies related
to the length of the relationship and level of trust, and the level of
trust and relational behavior.
2.1. Length of relationship and level of trust
A number of studies in the past have examined the relation-
ship between time and trust. Ganesan (1994), for example, studied
buyer's trust in the supplier through the duration of a relationship.
The author hypothesized that a retailer's experience with a vendor is
positively related to retailer's trust in the vendor. The results show-
ed that a retailer's experience with a vendor did not have a signiﬁcant
effect on the retailer's trust in the vendor. Contrary to some previous
studies (e.g. Anderson & Weitz, 1989), the author did not ﬁnd asigniﬁcant positive relationship between the length of the relation-
ship between partners and the level of trust retailers had in the
vendor. In another study, Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995)
hypothesized that relationship age would have a positive impact
on relationship quality. In this study, relationship quality was com-
posed of trust in the partner's honesty, benevolence, commitment,
expectation of continuity, and willingness to invest. The authors
reported that, contrary to their hypothesis, no main effects of rela-
tionship age on relationship quality were observed. Indeed, all the
other hypotheses related to relationship age were rejected. More-
over, Handﬁeld and Bechtel's (2002) study found that the long term
relationship between a buyer and a supplier based on formalized
contracts “had little effect on the level of trust the buyer placed in
the supplier” (p. 375).
These intriguing results might be explained in different ways.
Perhaps buyer's trust has very little to do with the accumulation of
direct experience. That is, trust may be independent of the duration
of direct experience and hence, trust may even exist without direct
experience (Ekici & Sohi, 2000). Perhaps, contrary to the ﬁndings of
the existing literature (e.g. Anderson & Weitz, 1989), the level of
trust between parties has little to do with their intentions to stay in
the relationship. Trust may increase or decrease, but it may not be
related to relationship intentions.
Other studies suggest that there may be a negative correlation
between relationship age and trust. For example, Moorman et al.
(1992) suggest that the length of the relationship may be negatively
correlated with the level of trust exchange parties have for each
other for various reasons. For instance, as exchange parties acquire
knowledge about each other over time (i.e. high levels of experience
with each other), the buyer feels that the supplier has lost its ability to
be objective. Further, the buyer may feel over time that the supplier
has become too similar to them, so that they cannot be counted on
to add any value to their business anymore. As a result, the buyer
may begin considering changing its supplier. Third, as the relation-
ship between buyer and supplier grows, a buyer's expectations
about supplier performance increases, which in turn increases the
possibility of dissatisfaction with the supplier's performance. Finally,
and perhaps most interestingly, the length of the relationship be-
tween parties may increase the risks and vulnerabilities of the buyers,
create opportunities for opportunistic behavior that creates distrust
and reduces the level of trust.
Grayson and Ambler (1999) replicated the ﬁndings of Moorman et
al. (1992) in the British advertising industry and reported that the
length of relationship will dampen the impact of relational constructs.
The authors indicated that this hypothesis is supported for trust,
which is a signiﬁcant predictor of marketing services use in short
relationships but not long ones. As far as interactions go, the authors
report that interaction is (marginally) signiﬁcant in long term rela-
tionships, but not in short ones. Contrary to the conclusions of
Moorman et al. (1992), and parallel to the traditional transaction
cost paradigm, in the replication study, the authors reported that
greater trust is associated with lower (not higher) opportunistic be-
havior. Recently, Liu, Yuan, Tao, and Wang (2008) reported that the
relationship length can reduce the buyer's trust in their suppliers in
the Chinese Guanxi context. More speciﬁcally, the authors noted
that, in time, Guanxi may increase the perceived relational risk and
weaken a buyer's trust in the suppliers' competence.2.2. The level of trust and relational behavior
Previous studies offer conﬂicting ﬁndings regarding the level of
trust between exchange partners and their relational behaviors.
Anderson and Weitz (1989), for example, found that trust increases
the propensity to stay in the relationship. Similarly, Kumar et al.
(1995) reported positive signiﬁcant correlations between trust
Fig. 1. Focal questions for the current study.
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adopted “continuity” items from Anderson and Weitz (1989)).
Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1995) studied the impact of trust on
performance in three countries (Poland, former East Germany, and
Norway). The authors hypothesized that as the level of franchise
interpersonal trust in the franchisor increases, the level of franchisor
performance increases. However, they reported that the hypothesis
failed in both Poland and Germany and was only supported for the
Norwegian sample.
Findings of Moorman et al. (1992) indicate that trust in the
researcher does not have a signiﬁcant direct effect on the utilization
of market research. That is, they could not observe a signiﬁcant
relationship between the level of trust and the hypothesized rela-
tional outcome of the relationship (the use of research). The authors
note that trust “did not have the strongest effect on research utiliza-
tion. Instead, trust's effects were achieved primarily through critical
indirect effects on quality of interaction and research involvement
level, suggesting that trust facilitates these relationships processes.
That, in turn, encourages research utilizations” (p. 322). The replica-
tion study by Grayson and Ambler (1999) reports that neither trust
nor commitment is an antecedent of advertising use.
Ryu, Min, and Zushi (2008) investigated the “threshold effect
of trust” and reported that “while a lower level of trust may have an
impact on a ﬁrm's exchange-related decisions, a higher level of trust
may not impact decisions once perceived trust is beyond a threshold”
(p. 55). These ﬁndings are parallel to those of Selnes and Sallis
(2003) who argued that lower levels of trust affect a ﬁrm's decision
making (regarding relational outcomes) while higher levels of trust
do not. In another recent study, Suh and Houston (2010) reported
that “surprisingly, trust – regardless of operationalization – did not
relate positively to the [relational] outcomes [such as commitment
and willingness to invest]. Although the preponderance evidence in
the literature suggests the importance of trust to B2B relationship out-
comes, our exploratory results provide [contradictory] evidence” (p.
748).
A particularly intriguing yet understudied topic in inter-
organizational relations is the “termination of relationships” resulting
from the level of trust between the exchange partners. An inﬂuential
article by Dwyer et al. (1987) on relationships pointed out the im-
portance of studying relationship dissolution reasons as well as its pro-
cesses. As indicated by the authors (and we argue that it is still true)
little is known about dissolution of inter-organizational relations.
Existing research (mostly in social-psychology and communications)
has suggested that the dissolution process can be understood as a re-
verse of the relationship formation (e.g. Miller & Parks, 1982), or a
unilateral process (Dwyer et al., 1987). According to Duck's (1982)
conceptual approach, relationship dissolution begins when one party
evaluates his/her “dissatisfaction”with the other party and a cost/beneﬁt
analysis could determine if he/she should terminate the relationship.
Baxter's (1985) conceptual approach to relationship dissolution con-
sists of two dimensions: (1) direct/indirect expression of disagreement,
and (2) “other orientation” (the disengager tries not to harm the other
party and ﬁnds another partner for him/her before the dissolution).
Trust literature in inter-organizational marketing holds that trust
can predict propensity to stay in the relationship (Anderson & Weitz,
1989) and levels of conﬂict between exchange partners (Anderson &
Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). These studies implicitly maintain
that trust explains at least a portion of the relationship dissolution
process and lack of trust motivates relationship termination. However,
as indicated above, most of what is known about relationship termina-
tion is conceptual. We argue that there is a need for empirical under-
standing of the nature of relationship termination decisions and the
role of trust in termination decisions.
In a recent study, Wang and Huff (2007) investigated the likelihood
of a buyer's future purchase intentions in the event of its supplier's
violation of trust. The authors hypothesized that the future purchaseof a buyer from a supplier who violated trust will be lower depending
on the magnitude of the violation, cause of the violation, perceived
likelihood of future violations, and length of the (trusting) relationship.
Their experimental study revealed that the likelihood of future
purchases will only be affected by the perceived likelihood of similar
violations in the future and the maturity of the trust relationship
(i.e. the buyer will less likely to purchase from the supplier in the
future if trust was in the early stages of development).
Wang and Huff (2007) offer some evidence for the relationship
between trust violations and the future of the relationship based on
hypothetical scenarios. However, except for a global theme of “viola-
tion of trust,” we still do not know what motivates these buyers to
decide whether to terminate or continue their relationships with
the suppliers. In addition, we don't know whether and how a
supplier's (not just a buyer's) “decline in trusting beliefs” (p. 1038)
may lead to relationship termination or continuation decision.3. Scope of the study
The ﬁndings of past studies illustrate the need for an in-depth
understanding about the role and the nature of trust in inter-
organizational relationships. Fig. 1 illustrates the literature-driven
research objectives of the current study.
First, there is a need to separately study the changing nature and the
role of trust in short and long term relationships. As indicated by
Grayson and Ambler (1999), “longer relationships are qualitatively dif-
ferent than shorter ones” (p. 139), suggesting the value of research that
emphasizes either type of relationship. In addition, as pointed out by
Seppanen et al. (2007), “temporal dynamics and level of analysis
in inter-organizational trust seem to be a fruitful area for further
research, with consequent implications on the development of suitable
metrics” (p. 261). In the current study, we investigate qualities such as
trust and relational behaviors for both long and short term ongoing
relationships and identify their similarities and differences. Our ﬁndings
can offer new insights into the measurement efforts of trust research
in inter-organizational settings. In this paper, the phrase “short term”
refers to relatively new relationships, and the term “long term” refers
to older/more mature relationships.
Second, both Moorman et al. (1992) and Grayson and Ambler
(1999) studied buyer's trust in the supplier (users' trust in the
researcher and clients' trust in the ad agency, respectively). As re-
cognized by Moorman et al. “our study is concerned with users'
trust in the researchers, but researchers' trust in users may also be im-
portant to the productivity and longevity of the relationship…Future
research, then, could examine whether and to what extent researchers'
trust in users affects research utilization” (p. 325). Most research, to
date, has dealt with the buyer's trust in the supplier (e.g. Ryu et al.,
2008; Wang & Huff, 2007; Zhao & Cavusgil, 2006) and relatively less
attention has been paid to the supplier's trust in the buyer. In order to
ﬁll this knowledge gap, in our study, we examine the nature of trust
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suppliers' perspective.
Third, a review of the overall ﬁndings of past studies suggests
inconclusive (if not conﬂicting) results about the differences in the
levels of trust between shorter and longer relationships. These results
suggest that the nature of relational dynamics in ongoing inter-
organizational exchanges remain unclear. The approach we use in
our study can provide valuable insights into these elusive dynamics,
by examining, in-depth, how both exchange partners view trust in
ongoing relationships.
Fourth, as can be seen from the above review, researchers to date
have primarily examined the dynamics among relationship age, trust,
and behavioral outcomes within a limited number of industries (and
primarily in services settings). We do not suggest that this approach
is a drawback; however, we argue that the value of the arguments
made by the above studies can be enhanced when other types of ex-
change relationships are considered. The review article by Seppanen
et al. (2007) also points out the preoccupation with certain industries
by stating that, “the majority of the [trust] research contexts seemed
to be technology-intensive. Technology and risks are often related,
and therefore trust is a critical concept in technology-intensive indus-
tries, which is where most of the articles were focused. In today's
global and networked economy even ‘more traditional’ industries
are dependent on partnership and foreign cooperation, and empirical
studies should not ignore them” (p. 251). In the current study, we
examine the dynamics of exchange relationships across industries.
Further, our investigation provides insights from both services (such
as an advertising agency) and goods (such as a beer distributor)
settings.
Fifth, one of the behavioral consequences of trust (or lack of trust)
in inter-organizational relations is the “termination” of the relation-
ship. As argued earlier, our understanding of relationship termination
is limited, and mostly conceptual. Empirical studies so far have fo-
cused on important yet rather a limited set of issues (such as resource
ﬁt and perceptions of betrayal) related to relationship dissolution
(e.g. Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992; Wang & Huff, 2007).
Our study attempts to contribute to the relationship dissolution liter-
ature by investigating the conditions under which buyers and sup-
pliers terminate their relationships in the event of little or no trust
in the other party. In other words, we aim to understand the condi-
tions that can lead to the termination of an untrusting ongoing rela-
tionship, as well as the factors that contribute to the continuation of
untrusting relationships.
4. Methodology
In this research, we utilize interpretive methodology and its asso-
ciated (qualitative) methods. Interpretive methodology is increasing-
ly accepted among social scientists (e.g. Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour,
1982; Zuckerman, 1988) as well as among the researchers in organi-
zational (e.g. Astley, 1985; Daft, 1983; Sandberg, 2000; Weick, 1989)
and (trust-related) inter-organizational studies (e.g. Bunduchi, 2008;
Finch, Wagner, & Hynes, 2010). Qualitative methods such as ours,
have the potential for shedding light on contradictory ﬁndings
(Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997), revealing intuitive, intriguing research
agendas (Price & Arnould, 1999; Sandberg, 2000), facilitating discov-
ery (Rafaeli, Dutton, Harquail, & Mackie-Lewis, 1997), and “providing
opportunities for advancing knowledge” (Locke & Golden-Biddle,
1997, p. 1029).
4.1. The study and data collection
In order to shed light on unresolved questions about the nature of
trust in ongoing inter-organizational relationships, we conducted a
series of in-depth interviews. In the following section, we report the
ﬁndings of these interviews, conducted primarily with middle-scalebusinesses in a U.S. Midwestern city. Informant proﬁles are shown
in Appendices A and B.
A combination of convenience and snowball sampling techniques
were used to select informants. Two blocks of in-depth interviews
were conducted: one with buyers and one with suppliers. An initial
telephone or personal contact was established for the recruitment
of either a supplier or a buyer. In the case of a supplier interview,
we indicated that we would also like to interview one of the
supplier's customers about trust in exchange relationships. Upon
the provision of a buyer name (by the supplier), we conducted a sec-
ond interview with that buyer. Similarly, when a buyer was ﬁrst to be
interviewed, he/she was asked to provide a supplier's name for a
follow-up interview. All potential informants were told that the
study was about the role of trust in organizational buyer–seller rela-
tionships, and that we are trying to gain a better understanding of
the meaning of trust between suppliers and their clients. Although
the buyers and suppliers were in a relationship with each other, the
focus of our interview went far beyond their relationships, to include
their history of relationships with many other exchange partners. Our
interest was to sample buyers and suppliers equivalently across a
range of industries and types of relationships.
4.2. Data analysis
Our analysis of the interview data, consistent with analysis of
qualitative ﬁeld studies, is an emerging product of a process of grad-
ual induction (Loﬂand & Loﬂand, 1995). This analysis process is
open-ended and creative. Although there are various alternatives for
analyzing qualitative data, literature does not favor a particular anal-
ysis technique. In other words, there is no single way to achieve
analysis.
Among the analysis alternatives, we use a combination of open
coding and axial coding (a.k.a “social science framing”) Miles and
Huberman (1994) suggest, “coding is analysis…Codes are tags or la-
bels for assigning units of meaning to…information compiled during
a study” (p. 56). Further, as indicated by Charmaz (1983), codes
serve as “short hand” devices to label, separate, compile, and organize
data. Codes also summarize, synthesize, and sort data observations.
“By providing the pivotal link between the data collection and its
conceptual rendering, coding becomes the fundamental means of
developing the analysis” (p. 112). Parallel to these comments, we ex-
amined informants to identify prominent themes and associations
between themes. A ﬁling system was established, including indexing,
coding, and categorizing. Following the suggestions of Miles and
Huberman (1994), we used codes as “efﬁcient data labeling and
data-retrival devices [because] they empower and speed up analysis”
(p. 65).
This coding and labeling scheme enabled us to pursue a social sci-
ence framing through axial coding of our data (Glaser & Strauss,
1967; Loﬂand & Loﬂand, 1995; Miles, 1984). The social science fram-
ing concept is based on trueness, newness, and importance of the “ge-
neric propositions” derived from the data. Generic propositions are
answers to questions posed about a topic. Using this social science
framing, we attempt to “provide general interpretations, developing
theses, formulating concepts, making assertions, and addressing
problems” (Loﬂand & Loﬂand, 1995, p. 182) posed through our liter-
ature review.
4.2.1. Coding and labeling: categories and themes
The ﬁrst part of our analysis involved scanning all the data (a total
of 521 single-spaced pages of interview transcripts) and searching for
dominant and emerging themes from the semi-structured interview
script categories. More speciﬁcally, each section presented in the
Findings section reﬂects an emerging theme/pattern and given the
data-set, it provides details about this emerging theme/pattern.
“Dark-side behaviors,” “continuation behaviors,” and “termination
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emerging theme has its own speciﬁc components. For example, the
“dark side behaviors” (as an emerging theme) has many different
speciﬁc components experienced by different informants. Not all in-
formants experienced/reported the same dark side behavior. Some
experienced “betrayal” others experienced various forms of “disap-
pointment” (5 forms of “disappointment” were identiﬁed). In the
end, all of these speciﬁc components take us to the common emerg-
ing theme called “dark-side behaviors” of trusting relationships. In
summary, in order to determine the codes and categorizations, we re-
lied on open-coding procedures in that we employed both intra-text
analysis (coding of each interview script individually) and inter-text
analysis (ﬁnding commonalities of the codes across many different
interview scripts).
4.2.2. Axial coding, social science framing and conceptual structure
The next stage of our analysis involved searching for a data-driven
conceptual structure that would integrate these categories and themes
in a coherent manner. To do so, once codes and categories are estab-
lished through open coding, we turned our attention to axial coding.
The purpose of axial coding is to identify relationship among various
open-coded categories and any other sub-categories that would have
emerged (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In the axial coding, the analysis
turns intensive around one category at a time and relationships and
patterns in the data are identiﬁed. Our objective in the paper was not
to propose a framework in a positivistic manner, rather to articulate
an emerging framework that would help us understand and provide
an in-depth description of some of the dynamics associated with
inter-organizational relationships. We summarize the results of axial
coding in our emerging framework (Fig. 2). This ﬁgure serves as a
general guide to the discussion of our ﬁndings in the next section. We
return to an evaluation of this ﬁgure in the “Discussion” section.
We followed the suggestions of Glaser and Strauss (1967), Miles
(1984), and Strauss and Corbin (1990) in developing this framework.
Three questions guided our assessment of the framework: (1) DoesFig. 2. Emerging model of buyers' and suppliers' perspectivthe framework capture a large number of themes? (2) Is the framework
a cohesive and parsimonious summary of the themes? and (3) Does the
framework offer new conceptual insights about inter-organizational
relationships? Trustworthiness of our open and axial coding proce-
dures and the resulting categories and relationships among catego-
ries were established through both peer-checks and member-checks
(Lincoln and Guba 1985; Wallendorf and Belk 1989). With respect
to peer-checks, emerging themeswere discussedwith three othermar-
keting faculty members and two of them (who are experienced in
qualitative methodologies) were asked to analyze (open-code) a sam-
ple of six interviews. We crossed check our ﬁndings with their coding
exercise for consistency. In addition, two buyer-informants and two
supplier-informants were recruited in the advanced stages of the data
analysis to performmember-checks. These recruits were asked to eval-
uate the ﬁndings (our categorization and the inductive model) using
their experiences. Member checks conﬁrmed the relevance of our key
ﬁndings.
5. Findings
The ﬁndings are structured around our main research questions: 1—
whether and how nature and the role of trust differ in short and
long-term relationships (Section 5.1), and 2—what are the behavioral
consequences of high and low levels of trust in buyer–supplier relation-
ships. The second research question is examined based on the following
sub research questions: a—what are the negative consequences
(i.e. “dark sides”) of high trust relationships (Section 5.2), and b—
under what conditions low trust leads to relationship continuation
(Section 5.3) and/or relationship termination (Section 5.4).
5.1. Trust in short versus long term partners
One of our objectives in this study was to investigate whether
buyers and suppliers view differences in the trust they have for short
term versus long term partners. Both buyers and suppliers were askede on the outcomes of high and low trust relationships.
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pliers (buyers). Without any exception all suppliers indicated that
trust DOES differ between long and short term partners, indicating
that they have higher levels of trust with longer term buyers. Thus,
areas I and IV (of Table 1) appear applicable to our supplier informants.
Area II (high trust in short-term business partner), however, does not
seem to apply to the suppliers. They tend tomake a conscious choice be-
tween their short and long term customers. Evident in many of these
supplier interviews is an active, constructionmetaphor—they arework-
ing to “build trust” over time. Also apparent in these interviews is a
stretching of the relationship from business to friendship, and a general
mixing of trust and other relationship factors. The following informant
comments are illustrative.
…there is, in the beginning because you don't have, you've not re-
ally established that trust yet or that personal relationship yet
with that brand new customer and you have I've got ten years
with Teri and so you know of course I've got more trust with
him then I've got with the new guy…”(S8)Hmmmm, well yeah I
think so to a certain extent just because it becomes more of a
friendship than a business associate. So the newer ones you might
still be working on to build it whereas, your older ones you've
been there and it's established. (S22)
The buyers, on the other hand, frequently indicated that trust
DOES NOT differ when they think about long and short term sup-
pliers. In contrast with suppliers, the buyers more often view trust
as a product/service attribute—part of the exchange package. In addi-
tion, they are less inclined to use a construction metaphor, and in-
stead, often view trust as something that is either there or isn't—a
kind of instant connection. The following quotes are indicative of
buyers' perceptions.
No, personally I don't. I think that trust is trust and if I'm going to
do business with somebody I have to trust them whether it's for
one year or whether it's a ten-year deal… I want to do business
with somebody I trust, either long-term or short term. (B16)No.
If I trust one of my reps, I trust them no matter how long I have
known them. (B23)
Our ﬁndings offer a counterargument to Ganesan (1994) whose
ﬁndings did not show a signiﬁcant relationship between a vendor's
experience with a retailer and the vendor's trust in that retailer.
Ganesan (1994) measured experience based on the length of the rela-
tionship in years. The vendor's trust in the retailer and the retailer's
trust in the vendor were measured separately with the assumption
that the domain of trust remains primarily the same across both
types of respondents. Based on our ﬁndings, it is plausible to argue
that the differences in views by buyers and sellers can be traced
back to their notion of trust. Differences in their views of trust
might suggest that the domain of trust changes between buyers and
sellers, and therefore, the items used to measure buyers' and sup-
pliers' trust should reﬂect these differences. For example, as will be
discussed later in more detail, buyers seem to view trust more as an
economic-performance related concept, and therefore, with respect
to trust, buyers expect all their suppliers to offer a similar perfor-
mance. These two buyer comments echo many others.
Not really. I expect similar performance from all of my suppliers so
I don't see why it (trust) would change if they were old orTable 1
Length of business relationship and level of trust in exchange partner.
Low trust High trust
Short term I II
Long term III IVrelatively new (partners)…(B15)I don't think it should differ, I
would like to think that they're obviously in business for the same
reason as all of my long-time suppliers are too…I'd like to think
that all of those guys are in business for the same reasons that
are functional within that particular business. (B18)
In summary, for the buyer informants, the distinct areas of Table 1
may not be very illustrative. As will be discussed in Section 6.1., the
buyers may have high levels of (pre-relational) trust for certain
suppliers, and as a result, may report high levels of trust for both
their new (Area II) and long-time (Area IV) suppliers. In addition,
as will be explained in Section 5.3, both buyer and supplier infor-
mants have long-term business partners that they have low/no trust
(Area III). However, for a host of reasons, explained in Section 5.3,
both buyers and suppliers continue their low/no trust business
relationships.
5.2. Negative consequences of high trust: the dark sides
In our study, we conceptualize dark side behaviors of a trusted
exchange partner as those that eventually cause problems to the
other party and/or harm the business of the other party. Literature
on the dark side of trust has primarily focused on “betrayal”
(e.g. Jones, Cohn, & Miller, 1991; Metts, 1989; Miller, Mongeau, &
Sleight, 1986) and relational tensions (Fang, Chang, & Peng, 2011)
as a result of close relationships (Anderson & Jap, 2005). Due to our
broader conceptualization, we identiﬁed various categories of dark
side behaviors. We also provided detailed and textured accounts
for various relationship tension variables suggested by Fang et al.
(2011). These categories include betrayal and several expectations
and relational dynamics that lead to disappointment, including:
setting high expectations, expecting trusted partners to go the extra
mile, being asked to do favors, feeling taken advantage of or taken
for granted, and being unreasonable.
5.2.1. Betrayal
Betrayal is a well-documented dark side consequence of trusting
relationships. Therefore, it is no surprise that our ﬁndings indicate
betrayal. However, we heard betrayal stories mostly from suppliers.
Earlier, we demonstrated that suppliers see differences between
sort and long term buyers with respect to trust. As the relationship
matures, suppliers begin putting more trust in the buyers, share
conﬁdential information, and eventually put themselves in quite vul-
nerable situations. The following excerpt reﬂects two interesting
things we often heard from suppliers. The ﬁrst is a kind of ongoing
interplay of trust and betrayal—we trust them and they betray us,
and second, the unintentional (non-opportunistic) nature of client
betrayals.
…We've had people in the past and recently we still have people,
and we will come out with a new program and we trust our
clients, we'll give them information because we knowwe can trust
them but then they go out and tell our competition and then it
gets back around and people get upset because one client knew
more information than another client. It's a really tight knit indus-
try. You trust someone and they just turn around and stab you in
the back even if they meant to or not. (S4)
Further, supplier informants indicate that high levels of trust
create opportunities for betrayal, because the supplier believes the
buyer so much. In the following interview with a sales rep in an
intensely competitive industry, we see not just a betrayal of trust,
but what the rep sees as a betrayal of a “good relationship.” Notice
again, the expectation that this is what happens—an expected inter-
play between trust and betrayal, rather than a speciﬁc, unusual case
of betrayal.
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thing you tend to believe so much that you have a hard time
believing when the opposite happens. Sometimes you have
so much trust you think they don't have any other alternatives
when in fact they do whether it is because of new technology or
whatever and they buy a competitive product. It's tough when
you have a really good relationship and they buy competi-
tive products or support competitive programs that are hard to
swallow. (S2)
5.2.2. Disappointment
When they go into a business relationship, exchange partners set
and/or form expectations about the performance of the other party.
Their trust of each other elevates and/or leads to new expectations.
They set high expectations for each other, may put their businesses
at risk, and when these expectations are not met, their businesses
may be harmed. In our interviews, we observed several types of
expectations and relational dynamics that led to disappointment.
5.2.2.1. Setting high expectations. Although buyers see taking risks as a
part of their business, it appears that they take chances on new prod-
ucts based on their trust in the supplier. In other words, their trust in
a supplier might lead buyers to set high expectations for the perfor-
mance of a new venture. As can be seen from the following example,
when the product does not perform as hoped, trust in the supplier
could potentially harm the buyer's business.
Well, sometimes you might set your expectations too high on
someone. For example, a supplier brings in a new product, like a
Christmas beer, and you hear up and down that it's good, and it
is working well for all the restaurants or bars. And, uhh, you then
bring it in and it turns out to be different than your expectations,
or it just ends up being a ﬂop for you. I would say that that's really
the only thing. But you have to take chances in business, and you
have to be willing to try new products. I think that that would
be the main way that something could come back to harmmy res-
taurant. (B10)
5.2.2.2. Expect trusted partner to go the extra mile. Sometimes disap-
pointment comes from an expectation that a trusted long term busi-
ness partner will reciprocate trust. Below is the summary of a long
story of disappointment. Due to a long term relationship, a restaurant
owner expects a beer supplier to even “go around the law” in order to
prevent the restaurant from any potential reputation damage in a bad
check incident. The client in this case is disappointed because in a
23 year old relationship, he and his supplier had never encountered
such a problem, and he trusted the beer company to behave in his
best interest when such a problem arose.
Our bank made a mistake and didn't deposit one of our checks
right…Well then we wrote a check to a distributor, a beer distrib-
utor in [city name], that the check didn't clear because there was
not enough money in that account. Well then the beer distributor,
who will remain nameless, well their name was [distributor
name], they at that point cannot legally sell us beer without it be-
ing paid for at that time. I understand that, that is the law. Well
they went further and they called up the different liquor pur-
veyors in and said [buyer name] is writing bad checks…They re-
fused to ship beer to us. So did another company because they
thought that was the law. It was a ﬁasco. After doing business,
we have done business in [town name] with that same company,
same ownership for 23 years, never had a problem. Not one prob-
lem… Instead of giving us the courtesy, instead of calling and say-
ing, “Matt this is abnormal, something happened, can you check
into this and give us a call back because as of this time we can't sellyou alcohol or we have to have cash or we're going to have to call
these other people, whatever it is, but we'll give you until this
time.” They didn't even give us the courtesy of doing that; instead
they just drug our name through the mud…That is the worst kind
of reputation to have, that they don't pay their bills, much less on
time, they just don't pay them, their checks are bad. So it was a big
deal to us. Until I contacted my boss weeks later, much after this
had all been resolved. I told him the story. Then he called the own-
er of [distributor name], who he knows very well, and then this
guy called me back, sucking up to me. It was too late at that point.
(B21)
5.2.2.3. Asked to do favors. Another related dark side of trust is asking
special favors due to a long term relationship between buyers and
suppliers. The difference between this category and expecting a
trusted partner to go the extra mile is that, here, the long term rela-
tionship is not only based on business interactions but also based on
personal interactions (i.e. friendship). Many commercial exchanges
develop into friendships, and friends are expected to do favors
(Price & Arnould, 1999). As we will discuss later, especially when
friendship is involved, one party may assume that he/she can stretch
the relationship to a point where the other party actually becomes ﬁ-
nancially worse off. This is perhaps the most powerful and potentially
most damaging dark side behavior, yet it has received little empirical
attention. Although we heard several similar stories, the excerpt
below is one of the best for describing the emotional commitment
and the ongoing dynamic of trust and betrayal.
Yeah, I knew this guy for a long time, 25 years, and he had had a
restaurant and was doing well and I was his sales man, and he
let his wife pay the bills and she had never done this so now he
owes us a lot of money and I say you know you have got to do
something about this, and he says I've known you for 20 years,
you know I will never burn you, and I said okay prove it to me,
and my management went in and worked out a deal with him
and he paid it off and okay, we're smooth. He sold that restaurant,
and started a new one and everything was going ﬁne, and then he
got a divorce, and I should have known at that time, okay, maybe I
got to pull back on the friendship thing, I mean I went to his wed-
ding and the whole works, and uh, so I went to him and said hey,
things aren't good, I know that, but do I still have the same prom-
ise that you won't burn me, and he said oh, yeah I won't. Well, he
did for $3000. So, he ﬁled chapter 9 protection from creditors, and
there is not money to get, he owed a lot and he paid off who he had
to and nothing to me. It does cost you sometimes to trust. (S26)
5.2.2.4. Taken advantage of/taken for granted. Moorman et al. (1992)
suggested that one of the reasons why the length of relationships
may be negatively correlated with the level of trust is that the suppli-
er ﬁrm becomes similar to the client over time and may begin to take
the relationship for granted. Our ﬁndings support this notion. In the
following example, the buyer trusts the supplier to give the best
price available in the market. However, the supplier believes he
doesn't have to offer the buyer a lower price because the relationship
between the two has already been established.
Yes, it has. (long pause) Speciﬁcally, one of my suppliers had quot-
ed me some pricing. I'll use dollar ﬁgures. He quoted me a speciﬁc
price of ﬁve hundred dollars on a certain item. I found out a few
weeks later that he had offered a better price to another customer.
In which case, I assumed I was getting the best price available. Af-
ter I had confronted him, he went on to explain that even though
we were a larger customer, the other customer out there
screamed a little bit more about the price. That's when I told him
ﬂat out, again this is when we were honest with each other…he
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this point on I want you to do what you have to do to get my busi-
ness because I will take my business elsewhere if this continues to
happen. I don't want to sit here and ask you is this the best price
you can offer every time; I shouldn't have to. It should be a situa-
tion where they know I want the best price and they will do what
they have to do to get me the best price. If they can't, then they
don't go down the street and offer something better to someone
else just because they scream a little louder. (B27)
It appears that both buyers and suppliers can be taken advantage of
by their exchange partners when they “have more trust than they
should have.” Implied motives for this dark side behavior appear op-
portunistic and provide a rationale for the control mechanisms of
transaction cost economies. In the previous example, the buyer
makes it clear that he doesn't want to be a watchdog and monitor
prices. In the following example, the buyer believed that he didn't
have to check for the prices offered to various other customers in
the same region because he trusted his supplier to follow the pricing
standards established in the industry. Once he ﬁnds out that he is
being taken advantage of because of his high trust, he becomes a
watch dog (uses control mechanisms) for their relationship.
From time to time throughout all of my business years, yes, I have
had situations arise where I went into dealings a bit too blindly
just because I did have more trust than I should have…And, from
time to time, I guess I feel I have been taken advantage of to a cer-
tain extent. The incident I am thinking about, we reconciled the
situation and I am still doing business with that company…I have
a couple (more) of them, since we are talking about [supplier
name] here, I buy a certain amount of gas products from them
acetylene and oxygen I resell and use some of it myself. Well, it
went along for many years and the price, as with anything, contin-
ued to go up as with anything, and along came a couple of the ven-
dors in that same line that came up from Missouri and Iowa that
tried to break into the southeast Nebraska market. Well, as they
came around, they were telling me all of these stories about how
cheap their gases were compared to [supplier name]. I ﬁnally
called them on it and they reduced their prices across the board.
And, of course, I was a little grumped. I didn't think I needed to
be quite that much of a watch dog on that sort of thing. If they
were so willing to drop their prices after a little bit of competition,
then they were probably making more than their fair share of
proﬁt margin prior to that. (B18)
As the following excerpt demonstrates, at times, buyers begin to
take advantage of long term suppliers. In this next case, the supplier
believes that the buyer hides some important information in order
to delay the payment, and in doing so the buyer assumes that the sup-
plier would not check for the accuracy of the situation because the
supplier places high trust in the buyer.
I have a customer now that has been a longtime customer that I'm
beginning to feel I don't trust. They used to pay their bills on time,
but now we have a bill that they aren't paying because they said
they were waiting on some government funding on a cost share
project, and that the organization is just slow in getting things
done. Well we happen to know of another customer that applied
for cost sharing after they did, and have already gotten their mon-
ey. So I have lost my trust in them because I think they are lying to
us. (S33)
In the ﬁrst two cases, the buyers believe that the suppliers are acting
opportunistically, but in the third case, the buyer's motives are less
clear. The buyer may believe that because he generally pays his bills
on time, he should be trusted, while the supplier feels he is being
taken advantage of. This thin line between reciprocating trust andbeing expected to go the extra mile or being taken advantage of by a
long term exchange partner is a consistent theme in our data.
5.2.2.5. Being unreasonable. A ﬁnal, and less common, theme of disap-
pointment relates to violations of basic exchange courtesies. Certain
minimal expectations apply to any exchange partner, and suppliers
and buyers are disappointed when these reasonable expectations
are not met. In the example that follows, the supplier went out of
his way to service a client, only to get a lawsuit ﬁled against them.
In this and other cases, exchange partners were disappointed because
of what they viewed as violations of the basic cultural norms of
exchange.
Yes, I can think of an example without even thinking too long
about it…In this case it would be harmed as effecting our reputa-
tion. Explain? Oh my, that could take a while, but I'll make it short.
Um, a customer was out of water, we serviced their well, and now
we are being sued because he had cattle die from thirst. First of all
the cattle were so gaunt before we got there that they were about
dead anyway. But what I'm trying to say, is when the lawsuit is
ﬁled against us, it is in the paper for everybody to see. People won-
der what we did, then people talk. I guess something like this can
harm your reputation in some ways. (S33)
This section suggests that many different relational dynamics lead
to feelings of betrayal and disappointment. However, as evident in
several of the cases above, these feelings of betrayal and disappoint-
ment may or may not lead to a termination of the relationship. They
may come to be an expected part of business relationships. Moreover,
disappointment and betrayal may unfold in a repeating pattern of
trust and betrayal, re-establishment of trust and subsequent betrayal.
In the next section, we look at factors that contribute to the continu-
ation of relationships in which there is little or no trust.
5.3. Continuation of low/no trust relationships
The literature has suggested that as the duration of the relation-
ship increases trust between exchange partners may diminish. Fur-
ther, reduction in the level of trust in the other party might lead to
the termination of a long term business relationship. Our results sug-
gest that low levels of trust (or no trust) may not lead to the termina-
tion of the relationship. Both buyers and suppliers indicated that they
have long term business partners they don't trust. In many ways,
these results are not surprising, although, in an era focused on trust
and relationship building, it's crucial to remain aware of the myriad
of other factors that inﬂuence whether exchanges continue. Our
data indicates that trusting relationships are desirable; however,
trust may not necessarily be a relationship quality that keeps ex-
changes going. For various reasons, our (buyers and seller) infor-
mants continue doing business with each other although they don't
trust each other. We separately examined these motives for buyers
and suppliers.
5.3.1. Buyer side
In this section, we discuss buyer motives to continue a no/low
trust relationship in the following three distinct categories: supplier
characteristics, buyer characteristics, and relationship characteristics
5.3.1.1. Supplier characteristics. Some buyers have partners that they
don't trust, but do business with for a long time because the supplier
has a strong, reputable company with a recognizable name. Prior re-
search suggested that size and reputation could determine which
supplier will be selected for the next purchase (e.g. Doney &
Cannon, 1997; Hill, 1990). Further, Ekici and Sohi (2000) argue that
size and reputation of the supplier could initiate a relationship. The
above articles indicate that size and reputation can speak about the
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trusted. In the current study, we are suggesting size and reputation,
not as a source of credibility, but a source of power. Due to the per-
ceived power of the exchange partner, the buying ﬁrm is willing to
continue doing business with a supplier, even though they don't
trust the supplier. In the following excerpt, the buyer feels pressure
from her customers to carry a brand from a company she doesn't
trust.
Um, yeah, we have a company that, um, I won't mention the name.
(laughter) But we have a company, that is in clothing and they are
a strong company, with a very recognizable name. Um, and they
do a good job, but there are several times throughout the year,
where we end up not getting necessarily the product, the exact
product that we wanted. Um, they may ﬁll us incorrectly, you
know, or we've been quoted a price and we get billed for a differ-
ent price. Something like that, um, and that's one that we kinda
look at and, it's a, again it's a very reputable company. People
come in and ask for things by that name. Um, so you have to look
at that also. It's not one that you can just yank lightly, you know,
oh, well they've not done what they said they would do, you
know, and it's happened 5 times this year, so we're not going to
carry their stuff anymore, because in the long-run that would hurt
our business, you know on the ﬂip side… (B1)
In extreme cases, exchanges continue because buyers feel complete-
ly dependent on suppliers, and feel they have no choice. Notice that in
the following excerpt, the buyer ﬁrst generalizes the problem and
then gives an illustration. In this instance, the buyer feels that the
supplier doesn't care, because his business doesn't really matter to the
supplier. Parallel to earlier illustrations, because there is no “trust
factor,” the buyer feels required to monitor against opportunistic sup-
plier behavior, such as throwing “their weight around.”
Yeah, there are deﬁnitely suppliers I have done business with for a
long time that I don't trust, but because of certain circumstances,
we have to do business. Going back to the grocery industry, I
had a supplier from [supplier name], one of the biggest companies
in the country and they like to throw their weight around; our
business to them was nothing. For him to worry about what I
did or didn't do was not a big deal, and I knew that. So, (pause)
with him and his company we never did develop a trust factor. It
was always a “trust but verify.” But because they were the only
manufacturer of products that we needed, I had to do business
with them; I had no options. So yeah there were deﬁnitely those
suppliers we did business with even though we did not trust
them. We didn't want to do business with them, but because of
some certain circumstances; we had to. (B27)
Implicit in both of these informants' reports is that although they
don't trust the supplier, their customers do. This both raises a provoc-
ative problem, and a theme from the supplier side of our data. There
is an implicit assumption that companies can deliver trust to all of
their customers, but our supplier informants stressed that trustwor-
thiness is a costly and scarce resource. Sometimes, suppliers feel
that they must choose how to manage their trustworthiness.
5.3.1.2. Buyer characteristics. A buyer may continue doing business
with an untrustworthy supplier because of corporate policies. For
example, this restaurant owner feels frustrated with a particular sup-
plier relationship, and describes his helplessness when the home
ofﬁce makes “tying” agreements with that supplier. Although the
buyer feels willing to pull his customers toward different brands,
the home ofﬁce is unwilling.
Some of it is just kind of company oriented. I have to order certain
types of tequila or liquor. Being a Mexican restaurant, our numberone seller is margaritas. I have to use special brands. For instance,
the other lady, I've already tried to get into business with, she
doesn't sell that particular brand. I'm trying to push our company's
home ofﬁce to change brands so that I can work with her, but I
haven't gotten anywhere with it. I'm really not left with a whole
lot of choices. So I try to keep it the best kind of relationship that
I can. (B10)
Corporate headquarters may feel quite content with their overall
relationship with this supplier, and in fact, other locations may have
excellent relationships with their particular representatives. As in
the previous discussion of supplier characteristics, our ﬁndings
emphasize the importance of considering how trust operates be-
tween a supplier and buyer at several different contact points.
Several buyers and sellers suggested that they are the type of peo-
ple who trust others, even when that trust is betrayed. Some suggest
that the nature of business is to trust, even though betrayal is an inev-
itable consequence. Because this characteristic was much more pro-
nounced among suppliers than buyers, we discuss this issue more in
Section 5.3.2.5.3.1.3. Relationship characteristics. Besides buyer and supplier charac-
teristics, the nature of a supplier relationship may give buyers reason
to continue doing business. In such situations, it appears that buyers'
and sellers' business objectives do not quite match (“companies just
never click”). However, buyers accept these situations as natural,
and therefore do not consider terminating the relationship. Implicit
in the following quotation is the interaction between corporate
policies, company objectives, and the relationship that forms in the
ﬁeld. Although a supplier representative and/or the company he/she
represents may be very trustworthy, other economic factors may be
more crucial in the exchange relationship. Similarly, a lack of trust-
worthiness may be less signiﬁcant than other economic factors. For
this informant, as for many others, discussions of trust and the rela-
tionship are bundled together in an inseparable whole.
Again, you've got certain companies that have better relationships
with other companies. [Supplier name] for instance and certain manu-
facturers at the corporate level have got very good relationships. By
the same token, there are other manufacturers that don't have good
relationships. So, it's kind of a funnel down affect. We are actually told
in some cases with certain manufacturers that for whatever reason, it
might be we're simply not proﬁtable with their product, that may
have nothing to do with personnel or something, it might just be direc-
tion. In those cases it's the same way with the competition, they may
have an excellent relationship with a company we don't. The two com-
panies just never click and therefore it's really tough for the people at
our level in the ﬁeld to click, because we're basically given a statement
that we really don't want to work with this company. (B2)
Besides the quality of the relationship, sometimes the level of
interaction is low, and trust is perhaps both less likely to develop
and less relevant. When the purchase relationship is not so frequent,
buyers may keep the business relationship alive, even though they do
not feel much trust in the supplier.
Q: Just to clarify: So you continue doing business with them, but
don't feel you have a great deal of trust in them?I: That would
be correct, but only because they just sell me a particular product
on an as-needed basis. If I run low of that product, I just call them
up. (B18)
The idea that trust matters more in certain relationships than
in others may not be new. However, focusing on ongoing inter-
organizational exchanges where trust doesn't matter much would
offer a contrast with current research that tends to focus on settings
where trust makes a difference.
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Our research suggests that from the supplier's perspective there
are four types of reasons for the continuation of untrusting relation-
ships: industry, buyer, seller, and relationship characteristics.
5.3.2.1. Industry characteristics. In general, the suppliers in our study
perceived their industries as highly competitive—leaving a relation-
ship means providing opportunities for competitors to enter already
saturated markets. As this supplier indicates, it is hard to walk away
from such relationships only because there is not enough trust. Notice
again, the metaphor of developing trust, and the way in which trust is
bundled with “connecting” or “clicking.”
Yea, I would say there are some, I would say I trust everybody to a
certain extent. There are some clients you can work with; work with,
and work with and they are not going to be able to develop trust. It
might be their personality, it might be their business, it might be
the fact that the two of you can't connect. It is hard to walk away,
especially in this day and age in a very competitive industry just
because you cannot click… (S2)
This informant continues his explanation, observing that in a highly
competitive business, it seems that suppliers continue doing business
with buyers for whom they have low trust, because terminating a
relationship may produce “enemies” in the market place. He prefers a
relationship without trust to a potentially “negative” relationship.
You got to be able to overcome these things and adjust your
personality to those clients. There are times you throw your hands
up and say forget it I've done everything I can do to develop a rela-
tionship with them and every time they have gone the other way
on me you've got to spend your efforts in other areas. But I try not
to do that because you don't want to have an outstanding enemy
out there. It's one thing if they are not a supporter of you and your
company but you don't want them selling against your company.
Irregardless of the fact that you cannot develop a trusting relationship
with them you do not want to have a negative relationship with
them. (S2)
Several supplier interviews suggest that maintaining a relation-
ship under low trust conditions is normal, simply because business
works that way. For example, this supplier, although he would prefer
his buyers to keep their promises to him, accepts the fact that they
may promise one thing and do another. Even though their actions
violate trust, and the relationship “takes a hit,” the salesperson
continues to sell to these clients.
Yes there are clients that I think would… I think it shows most
deﬁnitely through being a salesperson whom they buy from. If
someone whose been my customer for a long time tries or does
let's say has a promotion running in his/her business and they
choose to buy from different wholesaler or salesman, then
they're still my customer and will be for a long time but I think
that the trust whether they said that they might use my product
or promise me a certain promotion and choose to go with some-
body else. They will in turn not end up…they won't not be my
customer any more but that relationship will have taken a hit
somewhat. (S30)
5.3.2.2. Buyer characteristics. As indicated by Held (1968), trust has
more to do with situations of uncertainty than with situations of cer-
tainty, or in her words, “trust is most required exactly when we least
know whether a person will or will not do an action” (p. 157). On the
other hand, when we know, through our long term relationship, and
therefore countless experiences, how the other party will react to cer-
tain situations, we take our measures accordingly. In the following
example, the supplier (an ad agency) does not trust certain long
term clients. However, this does not seem to worry him so much
because their untrustworthy behavior has become predictable andexpected. Since their behavior is expected, the supplier does not con-
sider himself in a vulnerable situation, and does not see any reason to
leave the relationship. Again, trust appears to be bundled with the
overall quality of the relationship.
Well this goes back to the question that I have been doing business
with some of them for so long but I still don't trust them. I still
know that every time I put an ad together for them even if they
sign it and say “Yeah this is great, go ahead and run with it,” I still
know that when it comes out on print they are still going to call
me and bitch at me, and these are the long time clients too. I just
expect it from them. (S4)
Our data indicates that, like buyers, suppliers may also sometimes
feel helpless and continue doing business with clients even though
they “don't want to,” because of the power of the buyers. Suppliers
feel that they have an obligation to keep these relationships alive for
the sake of the business. This supplier begins by describing a trusting
relationship as one where, if things go wrong, the customer is willing
to work things out. This is consistent with our earlier discussion of
expecting reciprocation of trust such as extra accommodation. He
goes on to note that with big accounts, he has to work things out
and keep them as customers, even if he doesn't want to.
I: I would say that the example I gave with [Buyer name] where
we've been doing business with them forever… but they don't
seem, it doesn't seem to be a very trusting relationship based on
their actions and what we provide for them. Um….. Another
example would be people who we have had for a long time who
have been customers for a long time and then one thing goes
wrong, they get mad and cancel all their lines, don't pay their bill
and then they get sent to collections. I mean that's not a very…, I
don't think if they're unwilling to work out one minor detail and
just say forget it and move on then I don't think that's a very, I
mean, we've had that happen several times too so… I don't think
that's very trusting.Q: What makes you want to continue to do
business with somebody like that that you don't trust?I: A lot of
times you don't, but if they're a big account and have over a specif-
ic number of phones. Say they've got ten phones and they are mad
because one thing went wrong on one of the bills or something,
one phone breaks and they cancel all of them, it's kind of an
obligation to try and help them and get them back on even though
youmay not want to deal with them, but you feel like, for the busi-
ness sake, it's kind of an obligation. (S12)
In other cases, it is apparent that suppliers, who are keeping
such relationships alive, also take personal and emotional “hits” by
“swallowing their pride.” However, as the example below suggests,
these potential personal and emotional damages may lead to the intro-
duction of traditional control mechanisms, possibly increasing the
transaction costs.
Um, well that's, you know, one of those things that you got to
swallow your pride and go back and…there is one account that I've
been screwed over a couple of times and they sell a lot of beer for us
so I have to swallowmypride and go back in there. It's just that I'm a
bitmore leary the next time and say okay I'm going to do this for you
but we need to set some guidelines here ﬁrst so… (S22)
5.3.2.3. Supplier characteristics. Supplier interviews suggest that
friendship as well as the supplier's character are important factors
that lead to continuing a business relationship, even when clients
cannot be counted on to fulﬁll their promises. This informant inter-
view resonates with many comments we heard from suppliers
about their predisposition to trust customers, and to extend courte-
sies to customers (especially friends) in need.
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would call him about paying on his bill, and he said he would get us
paid, I promise. Well, I trusted him, and he never did pay the bill.
But the family was also going through a divorce and were having ﬁ-
nancial problems. The father of the client did end up paying the bill,
when he heard it wasn't paid. I guess what makes us continue doing
business with the guy is that we like him. My husband would do
anything for anybody, and that, he carries through in our business.
Like he says to me, they are out of water, and they need it. I have
commented to him that they don't pay their bills well, and he says
we'll deal with that when the times comes. People need water. He
just trusts people, no matter what. (S33)
5.3.2.4. Relationship characteristics. Parallel to buyers, several suppliers
suggested that as long as the business is proﬁtable and/or has poten-
tial to be even more proﬁtable in the future, lack of trust does not lead
to the termination of the relationship. For example, this supplier talks
about how he does not trust some of his current clients.
Yes, there are some of my customers that I have been dealing with
for a long time that I don't trust. The honesty isn't there. They try
to take advantage of you all of the time. They are only in the busi-
ness for themselves. They are just constantly trying to screw me
and therefore I have to watch their business very closely and am
not allowed to trust them. Real trust is a partnership. You have
to work together to get a good trusting relationship and work
toward a common goal. If things start to lean one way or the other
you start to lose trust.
When we ask, what makes him continue to do business with this
client, he replies:
Well, I'm going to do business with this client until it is no longer
proﬁtable. Once they begin to take advantage and try to hurt
your market of something, then you have second thoughts. This
happens but very rarely. (S7)
Another supplier makes it even more explicit that sometimes
economic and ﬁnancial considerations offset relationship qualities
such as friendship and loyalty.
Because it is a dollar and cents thing. Obviously we are in this busi-
ness to make a proﬁt and not everybody whom you do business
with is obviously not going to be your best friend, most loyal
friend, or most loyal customer if you will and stuff. You do in this
business, have to sell a certain amount of merchandise to, ah, pay
the bills. (S24)
In other cases, suppliers may be motivated to keep untrustworthy
clients simply because they do not perceive any ﬁnancial risk associated
with continuing these relationships. This pharmaceutical company
salesperson, for example, has clients (doctors) who apparently lie to
him about their usage of his products. However, he still keeps these
doctors' accounts.
Are there any client's out there I don't trust that I have been doing
business with? Well ya, there are a few doctors… They say they
have been using my products for the 18 months I have been visit-
ing them. When you go look at the sales data they haven't been
using them, so that is an example for this type of instance. (S23)
5.4. Termination of low/no-trust relationships
As evidenced through the above interview excerpts, some compa-
nies may continue doing business with partners although they don't
trust them. At the same time, organizational buyers and suppliers may
terminate their business relationships with partners with whom theydon't have any trust. When there is low or no trust, “under what condi-
tions do companies prefer to continue or terminate their businesses”
remains an intriguing, yet relatively unanswered question. Our data
indicates that one possible overarching threshold for terminating a
relationship under a low/no trust condition is the availability of alter-
natives. Although buyers and suppliers mentioned various conditions
in which they decided to terminate an ongoing relationship, in many
cases they were able to “walk away” from the relationship, because
they “could go somewhere else.”
We also observed through our interviews that companies who had
to terminate their ongoing business relationships were unwilling to
talk about these relationships and their break-ups. We believe that
there are two basic reasons for this unwillingness. First, companies
don't want to talk about their misjudgments and disappointments.
Second, as indicated earlier, some companies continue doing business
with untrustworthy partners because they don't want “outstanding
enemies” or “negative relationships” in the market. They may fear
that talking about these relationships could also create enemies in
the marketplace.
Below, we identify speciﬁc situations that lead to terminating low/
no-trust relationships. The following themes are identiﬁed based on
the responses to the question: “Have you ever cut off a relationship
with a supplier because you feel you don't trust them?”
5.4.1. Incompetent business partner
Competence has been identiﬁed as one of themost important build-
ing blocks of trust (Barber, 1983; Renn & Levine, 1991). Barber (1983),
for example, describes trust as expectations about competence and
ﬁduciary responsibility. It is also apparent from our study that a lack
of competence leads to a lack of trust, andmoreover, to the termination
of the relationship.
Yes, there is a client in [town name] whom is constantly a prob-
lematic client. He does not know how to run his business, where
there is a business two blocks up the street who does three times
the business he does just because of the way he chooses to run his
business. I have had to give him ultimatums to get him to change
his ordering habits. Basically what it boils down to is that if he
wants to partake in any of our products or our specials he has to
start changing his actions and gain some of our trust. (S3)
5.4.2. Betrayal
Betrayal seems to be one of the most important and easily justiﬁ-
able reasons to end a relationship that is already characterized by low
trust. At the same time, it appears that it is the most difﬁcult one to
articulate. Throughout the interviews, we observed that the infor-
mants preferred either short sentences and/or general terms (instead
of describing particular incidents) when they talk about betrayal.
They were unwilling to provide any details about the betrayal inci-
dents. Later in the paper, we will provide more discussion about the
implications of this observation.
Well at various times…..uh….and I probably won't want to get in-
to details….I have cut ties with some businesses I felt had betrayed
me or something…I already wasn't feeling good about this one
guy (referring his supplier) for a while and when I felt he betrayed
me, I just went somewhere else. That's capitalism I guess, huh?
(B15)
5.4.3. Not caring and unfair/unreasonable business partner
Our study indicates that caring and being reasonable are impor-
tant factors that industrial buyers and suppliers expect from their
business partners in order to maintain the relationship. These dimen-
sions are like Renn and Levine (1991) and Kasperson, Golding, and
Tuler (1992) who viewed fairness (acknowledgement and adequate
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for and beneﬁce to trusting individuals) as important attributes
of trust. Further, Kumar et al. (1995) suggested that fairness plays
an important role in developing long term relationships between
relatively smaller, vulnerable resellers and larger, powerful suppliers.
Yeah. I had two competing companies, which I don't wish to men-
tion their names, that were selling the same products. Both com-
panies were offering the same product at basically the same
price. I would take all the products from one company over the
other company every time because I knew the one company al-
ready had a lot of business, whereas the other company didn't
have as much business but they would give me more personal at-
tention. So, every time I would take the products over the other
company because I had a better relationship with the other com-
pany. Again, it goes back to that trust factor, I didn't trust the larg-
er company, so I decided I would take every other product
possible from the other company. The larger company just didn't
seem to care about me or my business, where the other company
did. (B27)
The same buyer indicated that he had to terminate some of his
businesses because the suppliers were not reasonable. The buyer
interpreted the supplying ﬁrm's policies and bureaucratic structure
as being unreasonable and unfair. As mentioned above, when fairness
of the partner is in question, the buyers seem to “take their business
elsewhere.”
We have a supplier for some hydraulic materials that we use for
our concrete breaking machine, that we were supposed to get a
one percent discount for if we pay in ﬁfteen days. In working with
our accounting department, there have been some circumstances
that have arisen. The company was counting the invoice in the ﬁf-
teen days, when it took ﬁve to six days for the materials to be
shipped to us. Also, the supplier was counting weekends in the ﬁf-
teen days, where most companies only count Monday through Fri-
day. So basically, we were down to two or three days to pay this
ﬁfteen-day invoice for the discount. So we were constantly denied
the discount because we could not meet their ﬁfteen-day rule. So
we asked them to change their policy, or we would take our busi-
ness elsewhere. After I talked with the sales rep, he said there was
nothing he could do. I said there was nothing else I could do but
what's best for the company and take my business elsewhere. An-
other supplier out there, could supply the same materials under
the same conditions, but was more lenient. I had a great relation-
ship with this guy, but just because of the bureaucratic situation
he's under, I had to take my business elsewhere. He needed to
work something out to re-gain my trust, some kind of negotiation.
(B27)
The idea of an unfair/unreasonable business partner is also evident
in some of our buyer informants who end a high sales pressure rela-
tionship. This buyer, for example, indicated that his supplier lacked
understanding, and expected him to place orders sooner. If the
order is not placed quickly, then the supplier will begin to doubt the
performance of the buyer.
Um, I have in the past, not while working here in this store, but
yeah, there was this one T-shirt manufacturer in Kansas. He had
a great product line, he had good stuff, he had good prices, but
he was a high pressure-salesman. He couldn't understand why
we weren't buying from him already, he was wondering what
was wrong with us type of thing and I wouldn't buy from the
guy if he paid me to. And then there are other people who offer
kickbacks, and they didn't sit well with me so I never bought from
them again. (B32)5.4.4. Not a proﬁtable business
Finally, the same buyer suggested that proﬁtability is a driving
force of the business. Therefore, when the business became unproﬁt-
able, he had to end some of his business relationship even when he
“liked doing business with” that supplier.
…Especially if they couldn't deliver, and I've even had to do this
with people I like doing business with. Their companies weren't
delivering, they weren't making up on their promises, you know,
ship dates were promised and they didn't come in; you've got to
do what's right for business, so sometimes you have to sever those
relationships. If it's not going to be proﬁtable for me then I have to
stop doing business with them. Also, if their prices get too high
and it makes it not competitive, I can't buy from them anymore.
(B32)
6. Discussion
The aim of this study was to provide some insight into the com-
plex dynamics of ongoing inter-organizational relationships. Our spe-
ciﬁc interest was the concept of trust. Using qualitative research
techniques, we attempted to provide an in-depth understanding of
some of the understudied and/or unresolved issues. In their extensive
review article, Seppanen et al. (2007) point out the importance of fu-
ture research that investigates “the temporal element of trust in
inter-organizational studies” (p. 261). Our paper responds to this
call by identifying the changing nature of the level of trust as the
buyer–supplier relationship matures. In our study, this change was
found to be particularly visible for suppliers, but not for buyers. One
of the important consequences of the temporal nature of trust is the
emergence of “dark side” behaviors. Our study revealed a number of
relational (or as we call them, “relationship stretching”) dark side be-
haviors that may eventually harm an ongoing buyer–supplier rela-
tionship. Furthermore, our ﬁndings revealed that, even though over
time, “the role of trusting individuals may diminish” (Seppanen et
al., 2007, p. 261), the relationship may continue. Moreover, as sug-
gested by a number of scholars in inter-organizational studies, quali-
tative inquiries such as ours, have the potential to lay the groundwork
to better understand and measure the role and the dynamics of trust
in organizational buyer–supplier relationships (e.g. Arnott, 2007;
Bunduchi, 2008; Rousseau et al., 1998; Seppanen et al., 2007). We be-
lieve that our ﬁndings can offer, “implications on the development of
suitable metrics [to study] temporal dynamics and level of analysis in
inter-organizational trust” (Seppanen et al., 2007, p. 261). In this
section, we discuss speciﬁc contributions of our study to inter-
organizational trust literature, make suggestions for future research,
and list practical implications for marketing channels and sales
management.
6.1. Contributions to literature
The buyer informants tend to treat both new and long term
partners similarly. On the other hand, the suppliers make clear
distinctions between their trust in short and long term partners.
These ﬁndings have important implications for research on inter-
organizational trust. As evidenced through the interview excerpts,
buyers have the same expectations of the new suppliers as they do
of the long term suppliers. Suppliers, on the other hand, believe that
trust is built and developed over time. In other words, our ﬁndings
suggest that the fundamental ways of thinking about trust may differ
between buyers and suppliers (also see Thomas & Skinner, 2010).
One implication of these ﬁndings is that pre-relational trust may ﬁg-
ure prominently in supplier selection decisions, but make little or no
sense to suppliers (Ekici & Sohi, 2000; Marimuthu & Dean, 2008).
Additionally, studies based around buyer perceptions (e.g. Ganesan,
Table 3
Buyers' Interactions with short term versus long term partnersa.
B11: Uh, yeah, probably to some extent and that kinda goes to the personal relation-
ship that you have built with the person you're in contact with. And, um, obviously
it's going to be a little stronger bond with the people you've done business with over
a longer period of time. But, then there are reps that you just connect with automati-
cally. And you know, and so it may not take as long, you know to build more of a per-
sonal type relationship. But, um, I'm sure, you know, there's the different types.
B24: Yes they are. For example, I will sit down with Nate, like I said before, for ﬁf-
teen minutes to a half of an hour weekly. And some of the newer suppliers, it's
kind of how it was with him in the beginning. It's fairly touch and go. They
come in and do what they need to do for me, but we don't really talk about any-
thing else. Nate and I sit and talk about a lot of different things that are going on.
Whether it be football or other restaurants down the streets or whatever.
B7: Russ: Yes, deﬁnitely. As you get on a more personal basis, you get to know
more of their personal likes and dislikes and they get to know mine.
B36: When you deal with the same person for so long, you know that person. And
it's almost like a friendship. But a friendship you maybe joke around a little bit,
or…I don't know I guess, just a little bit different relationship there. Until you
have dealt with that supplier for a while and come to understand how that sup-
pliers thinks. And how each other thinks and operates and does business.
B8: Yes, with a long term supplier I will have not only a business relationship but
also a personal relationship with them like I will go to dinner with them when
they are in town or whatever. With a short term supplier I don't have those
types of relationships with I generally not make myself available for social en-
gagements with a short term supplier that I don't order from.
B30: I have a supplier, my nuts and bolts guy, comes in and I know him really well;
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duration of a partnership and trust. Our ﬁndings suggest that the
relationship between duration and trust may be more meaningful
when we investigate trust from the supplier's point of view. More
importantly, our ﬁndings suggest the need to approach buyers' and
sellers' perceptions of trust separately.
Let us elaborate this last point further. As a part of our interviews,
we asked all the respondents about their “interactions” with long
term versus short term business partners. Both buyer and supplier in-
formants indicated that their interactions with short term and long
term partners are different; they reported more frequent and more
personal interaction with long term partners as compared to short
term partners (see Tables 2 and 3 for examples of interview
excerpts).
Earlier, we suggested that buyers do not see differences in the
trust they have for their long versus short term suppliers. However,
they see their interactions as different between the two types of sup-
pliers. These ﬁndings may suggest that, compared to suppliers, buyers
tend to make clearer distinctions between personal interactions with
suppliers and trust in suppliers. Similar to the “calculative economic
reasoning” argument of Williamson (1993, p. 453), our ﬁndings fur-
ther suggest that buyers appear to view trust more as an “economic
exchange” construct. Suppliers make close connections between theTable 2
Suppliers' interactions with short term versus long term partnersa.
S16: Oh yeah, that just goes back to the palin' around, or someone I've been talking to
since I have stepped foot in there. It's just like calling up one of my friends from the
house here and there is nothing weird involved in it. Uhh, yeah but did you say short
time or ﬁrst time?
Interviewer: Just relatively new clients.
S16: It's just all about rapport, it just takes time to get to know somebody. You can usu-
ally tell pretty quickly, if you're talking to someone that's not, just about anybody can
tell that. If you're talking to someone that's nice or if you don't get along or not right off
the bat. But yeah, the longer you're with them the longer you trust them.
S36. Yes, with long time clients, a lot of business is done over the phone. With new
clients, you have to see them face to face quite often in order for you to start a
trusting relationship. You have to make it more personal.
S8: Exactly, I think that they are different in the beginning and that it starts mainly
on a smaller scale, I can pretty much tell, this person is very nice, I think I can
trust this person, this person is not going to you know lie to me a lot or I think
that they are going to do what they say and I'm going to do what I say so that
they have a trust in me, for instance, Latin America, I gotta go to Argentina to
go to Chile in the next thirty days, I met a perspective new client at furniture
show out in Highpoint, North Carolina, about a week ago, met these gentlemen
who run a manufacturing plant, and they're great really nice people and I
could feel that we were developing trust within the ﬁrst ﬁfteen minutes of the
conversation and that there was a comfort level there for both parties and so
I'm going to be ﬂying down there and they want me to come and learn about
them and so once we learn a little bit more about each other as people and
then I'm going to learn a little bit more about their business and there's going
to be a bit more interactions personally and so that we'll both gain some trust.
S1:Yeah, more personal in the long run. I mean, after you get to trust someone, I
mean
You get more personally involved. I mean you get to know their kids, their birth-
days,
You know, just things like that, and that builds and then there's business issues,
which
make it a little easier.
S14: Yeah, like I said it all go back to the friendship thing. I have a couple of ac-
counts where I can go in and not bring up pitchbook or any type of point of
sale and just say hey listen we got this going next week, wanna do it? Let's do
it whereas the people you don't know quite as well they don't trust you as
well either so you have to convince them this is the way to go, that this is
what they should do. So it takes a lot more convincing on my end, but yeah it's
a lot different. I mean, people I've been around a long time it's more like small
talk.
a These excerpts represent a sample of responses to the question “Are the interac-
tions between you and your long time clients different from the interactions between
you and your relatively new clients?”
I knew him before I started to work with X, from the Y (actual names were de-
leted). I could sit down with him and have both a comfortable business and per-
sonal conversation. You just can't do that with your new clients because that
personal level has not been reached yet.
a These excerpts represent a sample of responses to the question “Are the interac-
tions between you and your long time suppliers different from the interactions be-
tween you and your relatively new suppliers?”level and quality of personal interactions with their short versus
long term partners and their trust in these partners. These ﬁndings
may suggest that suppliers view trust more as a “relational” construct
than as a primarily economic exchange construct. Future studies may
test the generalizability of our ﬁndings.
Recently, Yang et al. (2011) applied social embeddedness theory
(i.e. the concept of strong versus weak tie relationships) to explain
the role of trust and formal control on opportunism and long term
orientation. The buyers in our study appeared to perceive their rela-
tionships with suppliers in the form of a “weak tie.” As noted by
Yang et al. (2011), “self-interest motivates proﬁt-seeking behavior
in weak tie situations, and cool and atomistic personal relationships
characterize these relationships” (p. 89). As suggested earlier, the
suppliers in our study, however, perceive their relationships with
buyers in the form of a “strong tie.” Yang et al. (2011) characterized
strong tie relationships “by trust and personal connections that
might go far beyond narrow economic transactions” (p. 89). Our ﬁnd-
ings, along with the arguments of Yang et al. (2011), may provide
further support for the notion that buyers and suppliers view their
relationships with (and their trust for) each other through completely
different lenses (also see Handﬁeld & Bechtel, 2002; Thomas &
Skinner, 2010). As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, supplier infor-
mants make clear connections between the level of interactions and
trust, whereas buyer informants do not make clear indications
about the relationship between interactions and their trust. These as-
sertions may also be tested in future studies.
Behavioral consequences of trust are complex. Although it is
appealing to argue that trusting relationships are beneﬁcial for the
exchange, our data indicates that there are many dark sides associat-
ed with these trusting relationships. Thus, we believe that the dark
side behaviors reported in our analysis deserve further academic
attention. Literature on betrayal suggests that it is highly possible
that a partner's trust in the other party can be betrayed through
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and the development of speciﬁc relationships, and higher levels of
trust are associated with greater likeability and happiness. On the
other hand, the very process of trusting speciﬁc people increases
the likelihood of being betrayed (Jones et al., 1991; Metts, 1989;
Miller et al., 1986). Further, the persons most likely to betray are
the closest friends and relations (e.g. Jones, Couch, & Scott, 1997).
We believe the integration of trust and betrayal efforts in the context
of inter-organizational studies provides a unique opportunity to un-
derstand the complexity and dialectical nature of such relationships.
Our ﬁndings illustrate the following two general types of dark side
behaviors: those that are related to “economic exchange,” and those
that are related to “relationship exchange.” Economic exchange-
related dark side behaviors are discussed in the literature as “oppor-
tunistic” behaviors (e.g. Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Grayson &
Ambler, 1999; Moorman et al., 1992). Rules that govern inter-
organizational relationships are not only a matter of economic ex-
change. In a broader social systems perspective, inter-organizational
relations are subject to the same behavioral processes associated
with all social systems (e.g. Stern & Brown, 1969). However, to our
knowledge, relationship exchange-related dark side behaviors (or as
we call “relationship stretching” behaviors) have received limited
scholarly attention. Two notable exceptions are Fang et al. (2011),
who studied how relationship tensions can moderate the positive
relationship between relationship quality and relationship functions,
and Anderson and Jap (2005), who argued that strong interpersonal
relationships between partners may lead to dark side behaviors.
Some research supports that “giving extras” is foundational in
forming friendships and inﬂuences customer satisfaction (Price &
Arnould, 1999). In addition, the sales management literature provides
a conceptual understanding for salespeople to “engage in discretion-
ary efforts that enhance organizational outcomes” (Dubinsky &
Skinner, 2002, p: 589). However, through our study, we identiﬁed
various relationship stretching dark side behaviors that can potential-
ly harm business. The social norms of a trusting relationship bear
similarities to norms for gift-giving, and future research may beneﬁt
from employing this metaphor to examine trust. In light of our ﬁnd-
ings, we suggest future research on the “relationship stretching”
aspects of dark side behaviors. Such studies would provide valuable
insight and expand the rather limited literature on relationship disso-
lution (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Das, 2006).
Earlier in the paper, we talked about our observations regarding
informant reactions to betrayal situations—they are basically unwill-
ing to talk about it. Yet, the damages caused by betrayal are beyond
sheer economic damages. There are personal harms associated with
the betrayal type of dark side behavior. As Govier (1998) indicates
in his article “Distrust and Its Discomforts,” betrayal is the violation
of a deep trust and conﬁdence. “Betrayal is worse than unreliability
or deception, worse than many acts of harm…A person betrayed is
let down by another with whom he or she has experienced a special
closeness, intimacy, and history of emotional connection” (p. 143–144).
It is plausible to argue that a person who has been betrayed by his or
her business partner, among other things, loses self conﬁdence, and
perhaps loses conﬁdence in the industry inwhich he/she does business.
Loss of conﬁdence can potentially affect his or her operations at the
micro level, and the economyat themacro level. Considering individual,
dyadic, and macro level implications, we suggest future research for a
deeper understanding of betrayal motives and consequences in
inter-organizational relationships.
Fig. 2 should be viewed as the results that emerged from our data
about the dynamic relationships between the level of trust and
relationship speciﬁc outcomes. It appears that the termination of an
ongoing (but low or no trust) relationship is less likely to be initiated
by suppliers. The only reason mentioned by suppliers to end a low/no
trust relationship is when they conclude that the buyer is an “incom-
petent business partner.” At the same time, suppliers appear to havevarious motives to remain in a relationship where they think there
is little or no trust. Buyers, on the other hand, have more variety of
reasons to terminate a low/no-trust business relationship. They also
have various motives to sustain the relationship, even when they
don't trust the supplier. The threshold for terminating a low/no-trust
relationship seems lower for buyers than suppliers. In light of these
results, we believe that more research on conditions where trust
doesn't matter may complement our far greater understanding of
where it does.
A further look at the industry proﬁles provided by the informants
indicates that almost all of the suppliers operate in an “intensely
competitive” environment. Only one company (a beer distributor) indi-
cated that they were a monopoly in the market and therefore, they did
not worry about competition. This is interesting because the data indi-
cates that the main reason buyers terminate their relationship with a
not-trusted supplier is the availability of the alternatives. In many
cases, due to the lack of alternatives and therefore high level of depen-
dence, buyers would prefer to continue doing business with these
not-trusted suppliers. Yet, almost all suppliers believe that their mar-
kets have intense competition. This might suggest that buyers and
sellers have different perceptions about the “intensity of competition”
in their markets, and their recourse to alternatives. Considering the
inherit limitations of our study, we believe that future research that
focuses on the perceptions of dependence would also make a valuable
contribution to the literature on power and dependence in the same
marketplace, as well as to the moderating role of competitive intensity
on the relationship between buyer–supplier trust (Zhao & Cavusgil,
2006).
In the last section of our analysis, we suggested that exchange
partners may be willing to terminate their nontrusting relationship
in the presence of alternative “places to go.” In other words, we iden-
tiﬁed categories and themes based on the assumption that there are
alternatives for exchange partners to pursue. It is plausible to argue
that today's business-to-business environment offers more alterna-
tives to ﬁrms than at any other time in the history of the industrial
era. Electronic and information technologies (IT), and especially elec-
tronic commerce via the Internet, have opened countless gates to
both buyers and suppliers. In such business environments, retaining
long term business relationships through establishing and nurturing
trust appears to be imperative (Bunduchi, 2008; Lancastre & Lages,
2006). We reported in the ﬁndings that there are certain attributes
of trust (such as being reasonable, caring, ﬂexible, and fair) that, if
not provided, can lead to the termination of relationships. Due to
the challenges associated with maintaining long term relationships
in the e-commerce era (Wilson & Abel, 2002), we suggest further
research to investigate the role of these attributes on trust and rela-
tionship termination.
6.2. Managerial implications
In addition to its contributions to inter-organizational trust litera-
ture, our study offers a number of managerial insights. In this section,
we brieﬂy list our major ﬁndings and discuss their implications for
marketing channels and sales management.
1. The results suggest that the relationship between duration of the
business relationship and trust for the other party can be more
meaningful from the supplier point of view. In other words,
while buyers tend to treat both new and long term partners simi-
larly, suppliers tend to make clear distinctions between their trust
in short and long term partners. It appears from the buyers' per-
spective that a certain and sufﬁcient level of trust does exist before
the actual business relationship with the supplier begins. These
results, although they may not apply to all industries, suggest
that buyers in an organization may be readily ready to trust a
potential supplier without a direct and performance-related
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mance potential of a new supplier and/or its sales associates.
Since (for buyers) trust is a “kind of instant connection,” the
ﬁrst-time impression the buyer gets from the sales representa-
tives becomes extremely crucial.
2. Results suggest that even though buyers may not see differences in
the trust they have for their long versus short term suppliers, they
see their interactions as different between the two types of
suppliers. Further, regardless of duration of the relationship,
buyers appear to view trust as an “economic exchange” construct,
while supplier view trust as a “relational” construct. In other
words, for buyers, interactions with suppliers must result in visible
economic gains to be meaningful. Based on these ﬁndings, we sug-
gest that when designing customer relationship management
(CRM) activities and/or loyalty programs, suppliers should take
into consideration that their channel partners (i.e. clients) are
more likely to be motivated when such CRM activities lead to vis-
ible economic gains. A successful example of such activities is the
Eggympic (the Egg Olympics). Eggympic (“Yumurpiyat” in Turk-
ish) is organized every other year by the Turkish branch of
Throw Nutrition International, the Dutch animal feed and supply-
company. The organization brings together suppliers and buyers
of poultry industry in Turkey. The 3-day event which takes place
in a luxurious resort hotel in the Mediterranean coast of Turkey in-
cludes seminars, panel discussions, as well as various sports and
cultural activities performed by all the participants in teams.
These activities create a bond among companies that represent
vertical and horizontal dimensions of this particular supply chain.
The interactions during the event lead to speciﬁc implicit and ex-
plicit “economic gains” for buyers, including a free all-inclusive va-
cation with the family, opportunity to meet industry-speciﬁc
bureaucrats and engage in lobbying activities, take advantage of
attractive event-speciﬁc promotions offered by suppliers, and en-
gage in business-related cooperative activities with other buyers.
3. Results further suggest that there are many dark-sides associated
with trusting relationships. Companies put their trust in the
hands of exchange partners, hoping to receive greater positive re-
lational outcomes (satisfaction, performance, commitment, etc.).
However, it is also possible to argue that trusting relationships
established by companies increase the likelihood and potential
damage of being betrayed by the company's trusted partners.
From the practical point of view, it becomes crucial to monitor
the dark side intentions of channel partners. Arguably, one of the
most effective ways to suppress or prevent dark side consequences
of close relationships is to, “evaluate older relationships”
(Anderson & Jap, 2005, p. 79). In this paper, we offer a framework
to monitor an ongoing relationship, both for buyers and suppliers.
More speciﬁcally, we provide a list of “expectations” that may
come from an exchange partner, and signal a dark side motive.
Continuous evaluation of exchange partners based on their “rela-
tionship stretching expectations”may prevent future dark side be-
haviors, and their harmful consequences for the business.
4. We identiﬁed two types of dark-side behavior: economic exchange-
related and relational exchange-related. Practical implications of
economic exchange related dark side has been recognized and
discussed among scholars and practitioners. The relational
exchange-related dark side behavior (or as we call them “relation-
ship stretching”) may also have important implications for sales
management. It appears, based on the ﬁndings, that there is a
crucial tension between reciprocating trust (extending extras),
and at the same time, not taking advantage of a trusted
exchange partner. Each partner is expected to give the other
partner “a break,” but neither partner is supposed to ask for or
expect “a break.” Such asymmetry in expectations can become
an important source of sales person–client conﬂict and can
lead to the termination of otherwise a smoothly-operatingbusiness relationship. As a result, these ﬁndings suggest that,
for both buyers and suppliers, expectation management be-
comes as important as the other components of trust (e.g. fair-
ness, caring, offering good price, making payments on time,
creating positive word-of-mouth) for healthy, long term and
prosperous business relationships.
5. Our results suggest that low/no trust relationships may not neces-
sarily lead to relationship termination. However, the results fur-
ther indicate that termination of an ongoing (but low or no
trust) relationship is less likely to be initiated by suppliers.
Buyers, on the other hand, have more variety of reasons to termi-
nate a low/no trust business relationship. These ﬁndings provide
systematic and empirical evidence to the common belief that “it
is usually more advantageous to retain a customer than to gain
one.” At the same time, we believe that relationship termination
motives and behaviors, of both buyers and suppliers, are crucial
for practitioners. Both buyers and suppliers provide self-, other-,
relationship-, and industry-speciﬁc reasons for continuing low/
no-trust relationships. Moreover, both buyers and suppliers
hold the other party responsible for conﬂicts that lead to the
break-up, rather than questioning themselves or their trustwor-
thiness in the relationship. From the practical point of view,
these ﬁndings support the notion that developing a sense of em-
pathy for the other party is critical for an effective channel conﬂict
resolution.
7. Conclusion
This study provides an in-depth understanding of some of the
understudied and/or unresolved issues of inter-organizational
trust. The paper proposes a model that delineates the relationships
between levels of trust (high-low) and their potential behavioral
consequences (continuation/termination), for buyers as well as
for suppliers. This inductive model suggests that ongoing relation-
ships that are characterized by trust may also breed “dark side” in-
tentions and behaviors. The paper proposes a unique set of dark
side (i.e. relationship stretching) behaviors that may eventually
reduce an exchange partners' trust in the other party. Low levels
of trust, in turn, may or may not lead to relationship termination,
depending on certain industry, buyer, supplier, and relationship
characteristics. Therefore, by providing a detailed account for
the potential moderating factors inﬂuencing the future of a rela-
tionship (i.e. the “motives” in Fig. 2), this paper makes an impor-
tant contribution to the rather limited literature on relationship
dissolution.
The qualitative nature of our study has both its advantages (as
discussed earlier) and limitations. Fig. 2 depicts the emerging
model/framework of our study. Testing the applicability of our
framework in broader empirical settings as well as the generaliz-
ability of the conclusions drawn in the previous section call for
future research. Moreover, even though we interviewed more
than 70 buyers and suppliers in diverse industries, it may be un-
wise to generalize the applicability of the results to all types of
organizational buyer–supplier relationships. Most of the buyers
and suppliers we interviewed represented small to mid-size
companies. The institutional and individual characteristics of
trust, as well as the diffusion of trust within an organization,
may differ in smaller and in larger organizations. The manner in
which temporal elements and dynamics of trust play out in
large inter-organization relationships calls for future research.
Such research may initially employ qualitative techniques to lay
out a grounded framework, and then go on to measure (test)
the emerging models of inter-organizational trust in broader em-
pirical settings.
947A. Ekici / Industrial Marketing Management 42 (2013) 932–949Appendix A. Supplier proﬁlesa.S Age Sex Job title Duration. of contact w/buyer Freq. of cont. w/buyer Industry Other Goods/service
1 56–65 F S. Rep 1 h Once a week Food dist State owned/both small and big companies G
2 25–35 M S. Rep 45–90 min Every 2 weeks Agri/chemical Intense competition/ever changing/mergers G
3 25–35 M S. Rep Varies Varies Drink Largest company in the market G
4 25–35 M S. Rep Regular Regular bases Advertising Competitive S
5 36–45 M S. Rep 4–45 min Once a month Drink Intense competition GS
6 46–55 M Owner 30–60 min Once a week Ofﬁce supplies Competitive market G
7 25–35 M S. Mang. 30 min–2 h Every 2 weeks Agri/chemical Intense competition G
8 46–55 F S. Mang. 1–3 days Twice a year Furniture Intense competition/relationship buying G
9 25–35 M Mark. Assoc. 30–60 min Once a month Drink Intense competition/strict regulations GS
10 25–35 M S. Mang. 30 min Once a week Drink Intense competition/strict laws G
11 25–35 F S. Rep NA NA Telemarketing Internet: big competitor S
12 25–35 F Acc. Exec. 30–60 min 2 a month Telecomm. Competitive GS
13 25–35 F S. Rep 30–60 min NA Pharmaceutical Competitive G
14 36–45 M S. Rep 30 min 12–18 a year Hardware Very competitive/relationships important G
15 36–45 M S. Rep 1–2 h Once a week Food dist Timing is important G
16 25–35 M S. Rep 15–30 min 2–4 a week Agri/chemical Very relationships/relationships important G
17 25–35 M S. Assoc. 15–30 min 2–4 a month Pharmaceutical High competition G
18 25–35 M S. Assoc. 1–2 h Varies Agri/construc Competitive/relationship based G
19 36–45 M S. Rep 5 min 30–60 a year Food dist Intense competition G
20 36–45 M Exec VP 20–60 min Once a week Drink Only Bud distributor in town GS
21 36–45 M S. Mang. 10–45 min Every 2 weeks Drink No competition GS
22 25–35 M Acc. Mang. 20 min Once a week Drink Very competitive GS
23 25–35 M S. Rep 1–30 min Every 6 weeks Pharmaceutical Tight Competition/regulations G
24 36–45 M VP Sales 10–45 min 2–4 a month Food dist Tight competition/risks are high GS
25 25–35 M S. Mang. 10 min 2–3 a week Auto parts Internet: growing competitor G
26 36–45 F S. Counselor 10–40 min Once a week Food dist Competitive/15 companies in the market GS
27 36–45 M Acc. Salesperson 45–60 min Twice a year Agri/chemical Somewhat competition/not many big names GS
28 46–55 M S. Rep 5–60 min Once a month Construction Very competitive/relationships important G
29 N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
30 25–35 M S. Rep 2–30 min 2–4 a week Drink A few large companies/regulations G
31 36–45 M Real Estate Varies Every 2 month Real estate Competitive GS
32 56–65 M S. Mang. 45–60 min 5 times a year Textbook Internet: new competitor G
33 N/A M Co-owner 50 min NA Agri/Construc Large investment needed GS
34 N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
35 36–45 M Mang. 5–15 min Once a week Repair/service Timing is important GS
36 36–45 M S. Rep 30 min Twice a month Photography Competition GS
a NA is used for the respondents who did not want some or any of their proﬁle information to be reported.Appendix B. Buyer proﬁlesa.B Age Sex Job title Duration. of cont.
w/supplier
Freq. of cont.
w/supplier
Industry/business Other Goods/service
1 25–35 F GM 10 min–2 h 2–3 a year Bookstore Risky inventory management G
2 25–35 M Territory M 5–90 min Once a week Agri/chemical Competitive GS
3 36–45 M Store M. 30 min 1–2 a day Grocery retail Timely delivery important G
4 25–35 M VP aviation Varies Often Aviation Competitive GS
5 36–45 F Owner/M. Varies Varies Food/restaurant Big competition S
6 25–35 F VP operations 30–60 min Once a week Banking Mergers S
7 25–35 M Farmer 60–90 min Once a week Agri/chemical Changing industry G
8 36–45 F GM 1–4 h Once a month Furnishings Competitive/relationships G
9 46–55 M Manager Varies Varies Drink/bar Large size-muscled suppliers S
10 25–35 M GM 30 min 1–2 a week Food/restaurant Prefers long relationships S
11 25–35 M Purchaser Varies Varies Telecom Volatile environment S
12 25–35 M Owner/M. 15 min Once a month Tree & landscape Seasonal work S
13 25–35 F Med. assist. 30 min 2 a month Medicine Very pushy and competitive S
14 46–55 M Project M. Varies Varies NA Not much personal interactions, mostly business S
15 36–45 M Owner/M. 1–2 h Once a week Food/restaurant Timing is important S
16 46–55 M Farmer 15–30 min 2–4 a week Agri/chemical Changing environment/regulations G
17 25–35 F Pharmacist 20–30 min 2 a month Pharmaceutical Strong competition/highly regulated GS
18 46–55 M Owner/M. 1 h Varies Welding Lack of many quality supplier GS
19 46–55 F Coordinator 5–30 min 3–4 a week Food/restaurant Government business/university policies S
20 25–35 M Owner/M. 20–60 min Once a week Drink/bar/rest. Highly regulated S
21 36–45 M GM 15 min 2–3 a month Food/restaurant Competitive S
22 25–35 M Co-owner Varies Varies Drink/bar/rest. Competition high S
23 36–45 F Physician 10 s–1 h Varies Medicine Somewhat competition/regulations S
24 46–55 M Owner/M. 15–30 min 3 a week Food/restaurant Fierce competition S
25 46–55 M VP/M. 10 min–3 h 3–4 a week Auto parts Very competitive GS
(continued)
B Age Sex Job title Duration. of cont.
w/supplier
Freq. of cont.
w/supplier
Industry/business Other Goods/service
26 36–45 F Owner/M. 2 h 4 a week Food/restaurant Highly competitive S
27 25–35 M Purchaser Varies Daily Industrial equipment Big suppliers dominates G
28 46–55 M Owner/M. 1 h Once a week Construction Relationships are important S
29 N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
30 25–35 M Owner/M. 2–30 min 2–4 a week Drink/bar/rest. Regulated market and competitive S
31 36–45 M Estate Br. Varies Varies Real estate Down market S
32 36–45 M Store M. 15 min 1 every 2 week Textbook/bookstore Customers shop online more often G
33 25–35 M Self empl. NA NA NA NA
34 N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
35 25–35 M Purch. M. 15 min Daily Grocery/retail Competitive S
36 36–45 M Owner/M. 5–30 min 1–2 a week Photography Shop Competitive S
a NA is used for the respondents who did not want some or any of their proﬁle information to be reported.
Append x B (continued).
948 A. Ekici / Industrial Marketing Management 42 (2013) 932–949References
Alderson, W. (1958). Marketing behavior and executive action. Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin.
Alderson, W. (1965). Dynamic marketing behavior. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin.
Andaleeb, S. S. (1996). An experimental investigation of satisfaction and commitment in
marketing channels: The role of trust and dependence. Journal of Retailing, 72, 77–93.
Anderson, E., & Jap, S. D. (2005). The dark side of close relationships.MIT Sloan Manage-
ment Review, 46, 75–82.
Anderson, J. C., & Narus, J. A. (1990). A model of the distributor's perspective of distrib-
utor–manufacturer working relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 48, 62–74.
Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. A. (1989). Determinants of continuity in conventional indus-
trial channel dyads. Marketing Science, 8, 310–323.
Argyris, C. (1952). The impact of budgets on people. New York: Controllership
Foundation.
Arnott, D. C. (2007). Trust-current thinking and future research. European Journal of
Marketing, 41, 981–987.
Astley, W. G. (1985). Administrative science on socially constructed truth. Administra-
tive Science Quarterly, 30, 497–513.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Barber, B. (1983). The logic and limits of trust.NewBrunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Barney, J. B., & Hansen, M. H. (1994). Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advan-
tage. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 175–216.
Baxter, L. A. (1985). Accomplishing relationship disengagement. In S. Duck, & D.
Perlmand (Eds.), Understanding personal relationships (pp. 243–265). Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Bies, R. J., & Tripp, T. M. (1996). Beyond distrust: ‘Getting even’ and the need for re-
venge. In R. Kramer, & T. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory
and research.. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley.
Bowlby, J. (1982). Attachment and loss, volume 1: Attachment. New York: Basic Books.
Bromiley, P., & Cummings, L. L. (1995). Transaction cost in organizations with trust. Re-
search on Negotiation in Organizations, 5, 219–247.
Bunduchi, R. (2008). Trust, power and transaction costs in B2B exchanges—A socio-economic
approach. Industrial Marketing Management, 37, 610–622.
Casson, M. (1990). Enterprise and competitiveness: A systems view of international busi-
ness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Charmaz, K. (1983). The grounded theory method: An explication and interpretation.
In R. M. Emerson (Ed.), Contemporary ﬁeld research: A collection of readings.. Boston:
Little Brown.
Chiles, T. H., & McMackin, J. F. (1996). Integration variable risk preference, trust, and
transaction cost economics. Academy of Management Review, 21, 73–99.
Cox, T. (1991). The multicultural organization. The Executive, 5, 34–37.
Daft, R. L. (1983). Learning the craft of organizational research. Academy of Manage-
ment Review, 8, 539–546.
Dahlstrom, R., & Nygaard, A. (1995). An explanatory investigation of interpersonal
trust in new and mature markets. Journal of Retailing, 71, 339–361.
Das, T. K. (2006). Strategic alliance temporalities and partner opportunism. British Jour-
nal of Management, 17, 1–21.
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. (1998). Resource and risk management in the strategic alliance
making process. Journal of Management, 24, 21–42.
Dasgupta, P. (1998). Trust as a commodity. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and
breaking cooperative relations (pp. 49–72). New York: Basil Blackwell.
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer–
seller relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 61, 35–51.
Doney, P.M., Cannon, J. P., &Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the inﬂuence of national
culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23, 601–620.
Dubinsky, A. J., & Skinner, S. J. (2002). Going the extra mile: Antecedents of
salespeople's discretionary effort. Industrial Marketing Management, 31, 589–598.
Duck, S. W. (1982). A topography of relationship disengagement and dissolution. In S.
Duck, & R. Gilmor (Eds.), Personal relationships, 4: Dissolving personal relationships..
New York: Academic Press, Inc.
Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. H., & Oh, S. (1987). Developing buyer–seller relations. The Jour-
nal of Marketing, 51, 11–28.Ekici, A., & Sohi, R. (2000). The role of pre-relational trust in ﬁrst time supplier selec-
tion. In J. P. Workman, & W. D. Perreault (Eds.), Marketing theory and applications
(pp. 265–274). Chicago, IL: American Marketing Association.
Elangovan, A. R., & Shapiro, D. L. (1998). Betrayal of trust in organizations. Academy of
Management Review, 23, 547–566.
Fang, S. R., Chang, Y. S., & Peng, Y. C. (2011). Dark side of relationships: A tension-based
view. Industrial Marketing Management, 40, 744–784.
Finch, J., Wagner, B., & Hynes, N. (2010). Trust and forms of capital in business-to-business
activities and relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 39, 1019–1027.
Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer seller relationship.
The Journal of Marketing, 58, 1–19.
Ghosal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. (1990). The multinational as an interorganizational network.
Academy of Management Review, 15, 603–625.
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualita-
tive research. New York: Aldine de Grayter.
Govier, T. (1998). Dilemmas of trust.Montreal, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Granovetter, M. S. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of
embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510.
Grayson, K., & Ambler, T. (1999). The dark side of long-term relationships in marketing
services. Journal of Marketing Research, 36, 132–141.
Greenberg, J. (1997). The STEAL motive: Managing the social determinants of employ-
ee theft. In R. Giacalone, & J. Greenberg (Eds.), Antisocial behavior in organizations..
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hakansson, H. (1982). International marketing and purchasing of industrial goods by the
IMP Group. Chichester: John Wiley.
Hakansson, H., & Snehota, I. (1995). Developing relationships in business networks. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Handﬁeld, R. B., & Bechtel, C. (2002). The role of trust and relationship structure in improv-
ing supply chain responsiveness. Industrial Marketing Management, 31, 367–382.
Held, V. (1968). On the meaning of trust. Ethics, 78, 156–159.
Hill, C. (1990). Cooperation, opportunism, and the invisible hand: Implications for
transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 15, 500–513.
Hogan, R., & Hogan, J. (1994). The mask of integrity. In T. Sarbin, R. Carney, & C. Eoyang
(Eds.), Citizen espionage: Studies in trust and betrayal (pp. 107–125). Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Huemer, L., Bostrom, G. O., & Felzensztein, C. (2009). Control-trust interplays and the
inﬂuence paradox: A comparative study of MNC-subsidiary relationships. Industri-
al Marketing Management, 38, 520–528.
Jones, W. H., Cohn, M. G., & Miller, C. E. (1991). Betrayal among children and adults. In
K. J. Rotenberg (Ed.), Children's interpersonal trust.. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Jones, W. H., Couch, L., & Scott, S. (1997). Trust and betrayal: The psychology of getting
along and getting ahead. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of per-
sonality psychology.. San Diego: Academic Press.
Kasperson, R. E., Golding, D., & Tuler, S. (1992). Sitting hazardous facilities and commu-
nicating risk under conditions of high distrust. Journal of Social Issues, 48, 161–187.
Knorr-Cetina, K. (1981). The manufacturing of knowledge: An essay on the constructivist
and contextual nature of science. New York: Pergamon Press.
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J. (1995). The effects of supplier fairness on vul-
nerable resellers. Journal of Marketing Research, 32, 348–356.
Lancastre, A., & Lages, L. F. (2006). The relationship between buyer and a B2B
e-marketplace: Cooperation determinants in an electronic market context. Indus-
trial Marketing Management, 35, 774–789.
Latour, B. (1982). Science in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Leonidou, L., Talias, M. A., & Leonidou, C. N. (2008). Exercised power as a driver of trust
and commitment in cross-border industrial buyer–seller relationships. Industrial
Marketing Management, 37, 92–103.
Lewicki, R. J. (1983). Lying and deception: A behavioral model. In M. Bazerman, & R. J.
Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in organizations.. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. B. (1995). Developing and maintaining trust in work rela-
tionships. In R. M. Kramer, & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of
theory and research (pp. 114–139). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.
Liu, Y., Yuan, L., Tao, L., &Wang, Y. (2008). Relationship stability, trust, and relational risk in
marketing channels: Evidence from China. Industrial Marketing Management, 37,
432–446.
949A. Ekici / Industrial Marketing Management 42 (2013) 932–949Locke, K., & Golden-Biddle, K. (1997). Constructing opportunities for contribution:
Structuring intertextual coherence and ‘problematizing’ in organizational studies.
Academy of Management Journal, 40, 1023–1062.
Loﬂand, J., & Loﬂand, L. H. (1995). Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative obser-
vation and analysis (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Lohtia, R., Bello, D. C., & Porter, C. E. (2009). Building trust in US–Japanese business re-
lationships: Mediating role of cultural sensitivity. Industrial Marketing Manage-
ment, 38, 239–252.
Marimuthu, M., & Dean, A. M. (2008). Developing pre-relational trust in technology
service providers. In T. Kautonen, & H. Karjaluoto (Eds.), Trust and new technolo-
gies: Marketing and management on the Internet and mobile media (pp. 227–243).
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organiza-
tional trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 209–222.
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interper-
sonal cooperation in organization. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 24–59.
McGary, E. G. (1952). The contractual function in marketing. Journal of Business,
96–113 (April).
McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., & Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust formation in
new organizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 23, 473–490.
Metts, S. (1989). An exploratory investigation of deception in close relationship. Jour-
nal of Social and Personal Relationships, 6, 159–179.
Miles, M. B. (1984). Qualitative data analysis: A source book of new methods. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook
(2nd ed.). Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.
Miller, G. R., Mongeau, P. A., & Sleight, C. (1986). Fudging with friends and lying to
lovers: Deceptive communication in personal relationships. Journal of Social and
Personal Relationships, 3, 495–512.
Miller, G., & Parks, M. (1982). Communication in dissolving relationships. In S. W. Duck
(Ed.), Personal relationships, 4: Dissolving personal relationships.. New York: Aca-
demic Press, Inc.
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., & Deshpande, R. (1992). Relationships between providers
and users of market research: The dynamics of trust within and between organiza-
tions. Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 314–329.
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994). The commitment–trust theory of relationship mar-
keting. The Journal of Marketing, 58, 20–38.
Nametz, P. L., & Christensen, S. L. (1996). The challenge of cultural diversity: Harnessing a
diversity of views to understand multiculturalism. Academy of Management Journal,
21, 434–462.
Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and
future directions. Academy of Management Review, 15, 241–265.
Pratt, M. G., & Rafaeli, A. (1997). Organizational dress as a symbol of multilayered social
identities. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 862–898.
Price, L. L., & Arnould, E. J. (1999). Commercial friendship: Service provider–client re-
lationships in context. The Journal of Marketing, 63, 38–56.
Rafaeli, A., Dutton, J., Harquail, C. V., & Mackie-Lewis, S. (1997). Navigating by attire:
The use of dress by female administrative employees. Academy of Management
Journal, 40, 9–45.
Rempel, J. R., Holmes, J. G., & Zanna, M. P. (1985). Trust in close relationships. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 95–112.
Renn, O., & Levine, D. (1991). Credibility and trust in risk communication. In R. E.
Kasperson, & P. M. Stallen (Eds.), Communicating risk to the public: International
perspectives.. Amsterdam: Kluwer.
Rotter, J. B. (1967). A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust. Journal of
Personality, 35, 651–665.
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A
cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23, 393–404.
Ryu, S., Min, S., & Zushi, N. (2008). The moderating role of trust in manufacturer–supplier
relationships. The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 23, 48–58.
Sandberg, J. (2000). Understanding human competence at work: An interpretative
approach. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 9–25.Seabright, M. A., Levinthal, D. A., & Fichman, M. (1992). Role of individual attachments in
the dissolution of interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Journal,
35, 122–160.
Selnes, F., & Sallis, J. (2003). Promoting relationship learning. The Journal of Marketing,
67, 80–95.
Seppanen, R., Blomqvist, K., & Sundqvist, S. (2007). Measuring inter-organizational
trust—A critical review of the empirical research in 1990–2003. Industrial Market-
ing Management, 36, 249–265.
Shapiro, S. P. (1987). The social control of impersonal trust. The American Journal of
Sociology, 93, 623–658.
Sheth, J. N., & Parvatiyar, A. (1994). Relationship marketing: Theory, methods, and
application-1994 Research Conference Proceedings. Emory University, Atlanta:
Center of Relationship Marketing.
Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the limited effectiveness of logistic ‘reme-
dies’ for trust/distrust. Organization Science, 4, 367–392.
Smith, J. B., & Barclay, D. W. (1997). The effectiveness of organizational differences and
trust on the effectiveness of selling partner relationships. The Journal of Marketing,
61, 3–21.
Stern, L. W., & Brown, J. W. (1969). Distribution channels: A social systems approach. In
L. W. Stern (Ed.), Distribution channels: Behavioral dimensions (pp. 6–19). New
York, NY: Houghton Mifﬂin.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory. Newbury
Park, CA: Sage.
Suh, T., & Houston, M. B. (2010). Distinguishing supplier reputation from trust in
buyer–seller relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 39, 744–751.
Thomas, R., & Skinner, L. (2010). Total trust and trust asymmetry: Does trust need to be
equally distributed in interﬁrm relationships? Journal of RelationshipMarketing, 9, 43–53.
Wallendorf, M., & Belk, R. W. (1989). Assessing trustworthiness in naturalistic consumer
research. In E. C. Hirschman (Ed.), SV-Interpretive consumer research (pp. 69–84).
Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.
Wang, S., & Huff, L. C. (2007). Explaining buyers' responses to sellers' violation of trust.
European Journal of Marketing, 41, 1033–1052.
Weick, K. E. (1989). Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Academy of
Management Review, 14, 516–531.
Wicks, A. C., Berman, S. L., & Jones, T. M. (1999). The structure of optimal trust: Moral
and strategic implications. Academy of Management Review, 24, 99–116.
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organizations. Journal of
Law and Economics, 36, 435–486.
Wilson, S. G., & Abel, I. (2002). So you want to get involved in E-commerce. Industrial
Marketing Management, 31, 85–94.
Yang, Z., Zhou, C., & Jiang, L. (2011). When do formal control and trust matter? A
context-based analysis of the effects on marketing channel relationships in
China. Industrial Marketing Management, 40, 86–96.
Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 17, 229–239.
Zhao, Y., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2006). The effect of supplier's market orientation on
manufacturer's trust. Industrial Marketing Management, 35, 405–414.
Zucker, L. G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure,
1840–1920. Research in Organizational Behavior, 8, 53–111.
Zuckerman, H. (1988). The sociology of science. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.), Handbook of
sociology (pp. 511–574). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Ahmet Ekici is an Assistant Professor in Faculty of Business Administration, Bilkent
University, Ankara, Turkey. His research interests include relationship marketing (trust
in both consumer and organizational contexts), macromarketing (quality of life, con-
sumer well-being, developing markets, poverty, and ethics) and public policy (food
safety, institutional trust, vulnerable groups, and poverty). His research has appeared
in journals such as Journal of Macromarketing, Journal of Public Policy and Marketing,
Journal of Business Research, Journal of Business Ethics, Industrial Marketing Management,
Journal of Research for Consumers and Social Indicators Research.
